Lynn’s article, Broker-Dealers, Institutional Investors, and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About Nothing?, 5 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 55 (2014), is now in print.

Several of Lynn’s publications were cited:

• Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 421 (2009), in Jonathan D. Glater, Hurdles of Different Heights for Securities Fraud Litigants of Different Types, 2014 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 47 (2014);
• Lying and Getting Caught: An Empirical Study of the Effect of Securities Class Action Settlements on Targeted Firms, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1877 (2010), in Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 669 (2014),  in Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation: Evidence from Japan, 2014 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 111 (2014); and in John M. Wunderlich, The Importance of the Prefiling Phase for Securities-Fraud Litigation, 45 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 739 (2014); and
• There Are Plaintiffs and…There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 355 (2008), in David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 907 (2014).