Carrie Hoke, Associate Member, Immigration and Human Rights Law Review
I. Introduction
On September 9, 2025, protestors in Kathmandu set fire to Nepal’s parliament building amid a wave of nationwide political unrest.[1] In the days leading up to the event, digital platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, and X (formerly “Twitter”) became hubs of political discourse, connecting Nepal’s youth around shared frustrations over corruption, inflation, and inequality.[2] The Nepali government responded forcefully by imposing a five-day ban on major social media platforms, citing national safety concerns and a need for tighter regulation.[3] However, many viewed the ban as a blatant attempt by the government to suppress political dissent.[4]
The government overthrow in Nepal underscores the urgent global reality that the right to protest is no longer confined to physical spaces.[5] Yet, existing legal frameworks do not adequately recognize and protect digital protest rights.[6] As social and political movements grow online, international and constitutional law must adapt to safeguard a hybrid right to protest that combines both physical and digital forums.
II. Background
Increasing numbers of individuals around the globe are using social media platforms to express political dissent and organize protests against government actions.[7] Digital platforms offer individuals a setting to share information, organize gatherings, and challenge government actions.[8] But as the use of digital movements grows, so do the efforts of States to suppress them, operating under the guise of public order or national security. [9]
A. Rising Digital Political Dissent and Government Retaliation
According to Freedom House, digital media freedom has declined for the 15th consecutive year as of 2025.[10] Of the seventy-two countries covered by this research, global internet freedom decreased in twenty-eight countries, and increased in only seventeen.[11] More alarmingly, people in at least fifty-seven of the surveyed countries were arrested or imprisoned for expressing political dissent online.[12] Nepal, although not included in Freedom House’s analysis, is yet another example of the growing trend of governments stifling digital political dissent.[13] The country has undergone significant political and societal changes, seeing an increase in government corruption and inequality and the subsequent backlash by the Nepali public against its government.[14] Public discourse began on popular social media platforms, such as TikTok, Instagram, and X.[15] These conversations centered around social trends that displayed the lavish lifestyles of the children of Nepali elites, starkly contrasting with the daily struggles faced by the average citizen, such as rising inflation, unemployment, and lack of access to necessary services.[16] This trend highlighted the cognitive dissonance between privileged elites and disadvantaged ordinary citizens, furthering political tension and drawing unprecedented attention against the Nepali government.[17]
In response to the public’s online dissent, the government imposed sweeping restrictions on social media, ultimately implementing a five-day ban on twenty-six major media platforms.[18] Officials justified the ban by claiming it was necessary to pressure social media companies into adhering to national social media regulations.[19] However, the public widely viewed the media shutdown as a ploy to censor political dissent and suppress online protests. [20]
Consequently, Nepali protestors translated online outrage into organized physical protest.[21] On September 8th, 2025, protestors took to the streets in the nation’s capital, Kathmandu, and stormed major government buildings.[22] The following day, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigned.[23] Ultimately, the nation’s parliament was dissolved, and the Nepali protestors instated a new interim prime minister.[24]
Nepal’s experience is far from unique. In September 2025, Türkiye restricted access to major social media and messaging platforms for over twenty-one hours after the Istanbul governor issued a three-day blanket ban on all protests.[25] More than 100 accounts were flagged for posting “provocative content” and several individuals were detained for their social media posts in connection with the protests.[26] Similar tactics have been observed in other countries: Uganda imposed complete internet shutdowns during its 2021 presidential elections; Myanmar’s military utilized digital blackouts following its 2021 coup d’état; and on numerous occasions, India restricted social media access during civil unrest.[27] The timing and breadth of these media suppressions are not coincidental.[28] By restricting individuals’ access to platforms where they may gain information, voice political dissent, and hold their governments accountable, governments are able to quash dissent, constrain political expression, and rewrite the narrative.[29] As social media becomes the modern public square, these shutdowns do not merely limit access to information but directly undermine the fundamental right to protest.[30]
B. Legal Frameworks Governing Digital Protest Rights
When individuals take to the streets or digital spaces to express dissent, they invoke internationally recognized human rights that provide the foundation of the right to protest.[31] These rights form the basis for human rights upon which many regions and nations build their own legal frameworks.[32] Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), an agreement which Nepal is party to, guarantees freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive, and impart information through any type of media.[33] Article 21 of the ICCPR complements this by recognizing the right to peaceful assembly.[34] However, the ICCPR recognizes that the freedoms of expression and assembly are not absolute. Both Article 19(3) and Article 21 of the ICCPR allow limitations on the right to expression and assembly only if the restrictions are lawful and necessary to protect legitimate interests, such as national security, public order, or morality.[35] Expression protections are mirrored in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), which affirms the right to freedom of expression.[36]
Although Nepal is not a party to the European Union and therefore not subject to EU rule of law, EU standards nevertheless provide a useful guidepost to Nepal in shaping its own legislation. Like the ICCPR’s limitations on the restriction of expression, Article 10(2) of the ECHR permits governments to restrict expression when such measures are required by law, aimed at pursuing a legitimate claim, and necessary to adhere to democratic principles. [37] Importantly, both the ICCPR and ECHR frameworks rely on assessments of necessity and proportionality.[38]
Within the European Union, Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides mechanisms for EU member states and the European Council to suspend offending member states if they repeatedly violate core EU values, such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. [39] Under Article 7(1), the EU institutions make recommendations to at-risk states to prevent the escalation of any potential breach.[40] The European Council may invoke Article 7(2) when a state is found to be in serious and persistent violation of the core EU values, allowing for stronger action such as revoking certain rights, including a nation’s voting power within the EU.[41]
Taken together, these frameworks articulate the idea that restrictions on protest, whether physical or digital, must be lawful, necessary, and proportionate.[42] However, States often bypass these requirements through the overexploitation of the national security exception.[43] Increasingly, States invoke vague or overbroad security threats to justify broad censorship and media crackdowns, eroding the very freedoms these treaties were written to protect.[44] The Nepal protests demonstrate how persistent political corruption and governmental overreach can result in widespread unrest.[45] In aligning with international standards and incorporating EU frameworks, the Nepali government may likely be discouraged from further restricting it citizens’ freedom of expression.
III. Discussion
This section analyzes the scope and limits of governmental authority in restricting digital expression under international human rights frameworks. First, it examines the distinction between legitimate national security measures and anticipatory censorship, emphasizing Nepal’s social media blackout as an example of disproportionate governmental interference. Next, it presents international case law that affirms the notion that digital protests warrant the same protection as physical protests. Lastly, it evaluates emerging enforcement frameworks as potential mechanisms of reconciling national security goals with the preservation of digital freedoms.
A. Valid Speech Restriction vs. Preemptive Strike Against Expression
International legal frameworks provide nations with the means to assess when expression is protected versus when it infringes upon national security or public safety.[46] To adhere to these international principles, states must demonstrate that any restriction on expression is narrowly tailored to address a specific and imminent threat, and that less intrusive means cannot achieve the same result.[47]
In practice, however, with the rise in digital protests, governments are increasingly using these exceptions as pre-emptive tools to silence dissent.[48] Nepal’s five-day social media ban, imposed before widespread unrest, exemplifies the growing misuse of this exemption. The Nepali government argued its widespread ban on social media was aimed at preserving national security by curbing harmful content, regulating international revenues, and enforcing accountability on social media platforms.[49] These measures diverge sharply from the necessity and proportionality requirements of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR as they are neither narrowly tailored nor justified by an imminent threat.
The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR (“Siracusa Principles”) clarify the boundary between protest and threats. Under this framework, restrictions on protest must address a genuine and objectively ascertainable threat and use the least intrusive means available.[50] To further develop this concept, the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information hold that a government’s desire to conceal information or establish certain ideals are not valid reasons to curtail expression.[51]
The acts by the Nepali government in implementing a five-day social media ban, whether in response to political discourse over social media or in encouraging social media companies to accept new regulations, can hardly be said to adhere to these principles.[52] Its blackout ban was not a reactive safety measure; rather, it was a calculated strike against political discourse, directly contradicting the necessity and proportionality standards.[53]
B. Case Law Defining the Limits of Digital Suppression
Recent developments in international case law emphasize the distinction between legitimate regulation and suppression of expression. In Sanchez v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) examined whether imposing a criminal conviction for failing to remove politically divisive online comments violated Article 10 of the ECHR.[54] The ECtHR held that while the party’s rights to free expression were not violated by the criminal conviction, Article 10 is the appropriate controlling framework for analyzing digital speech.[55] Sanchez affirmed that online political expression must receive the same protection as offline expression.[56]
Similarly, the Eighth Chamber of the Constitutional Court of Colombia in Bejarano v. Ministry of Defense specifically addressed the issue of digital protest rights and unilateral government acts of suppression.[57] Bejarano involved the Colombian government’s use of signal jammers and widespread interruption of internet service while public protests took place.[58] The Eighth Chamber ultimately held that the government’s failure to provide petitioners with timely, truthful, and complete information about the use of signal jammers and interruptions of internet service resulted in a violation of their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly, further asserting a duty to investigate and to communicate promptly.[59]
Sanchez and Bejarano illustrate a growing international consensus that digital protests reserve the same rights as physical protests.[60] Together, these cases support the notion that government interference with online communication, absent valid and proportionate justification, jeopardizes individuals’ rights to express themselves in digital forums. Although preserving national security is a valid state interest, governments must ensure that efforts to preserve national security do not come at the expense of digital freedom. This principle was observed in Nepal when the government’s blanket ban of social media, justified on national security grounds, was widely criticized as a disproportionate and baseless attack on free speech.[61]
C. Balancing National Security and Digital Freedoms
Efforts to reconcile national security with digital expression are emerging but remain inconsistently and inefficiently utilized.[62] The Rabat Plan of Action, articulated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2013, attempts to do just this.[63] The framework provides six factors to consider in restricting expression: (1) the social and political context of the expression; (2) the speaker’s influence and position in society; (3) the intent to incite a feeling with the expression; (4) the content and form of the speech; (5) the extent of its dissemination; and (6) the likelihood and imminence of a resulting harmful incident. [64] While originally designed to combat hate speech, its criteria may be repurposed to evaluate digital protests and government response.[65] In 2019, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression issued a statement urging companies to adopt the Rabat Plan of Action into their company policies as a tool to determine when online speech warrants restriction.[66] Nepal should extend the U.N.’s guidance to its government and adopt the principles outlined in the Rabat Plan of Action into its legal framework to effectively ensure that governmental media restrictions respond to concrete dangers rather than speculative unrest. [67] Another potential enforcement mechanism is found in a European Union framework, which, while not legally binding over Nepal, provides standards that may serve as a useful enforcement model.
Within the European Union, Article 7 proceedings under the Treaty on European Union provide potential enforcement mechanisms.[68] Article 7 empowers the EU to sanction states that repeatedly undermine democratic principles. These sanctions may include suspending any rights that come from EU membership, such as voting rights. Losing its vote effectively reduces the nation’s influence within the system.[69] If Nepal were to adopt similar legislation by imposing sanctions for censorship and promoting accountability, it could establish meaningful deterrence against rising digital suppression.
Nepal’s 2025 movement against media censorship underscores why such accountability matters. The government’s digital blackout did not preserve national security but rather accelerated the nation’s collapse by deepening mistrust and uniting a population empowered through social media.[70] The resulting overthrow of the Nepali government shows that silencing citizens tends to intensify, rather than defuse, unrest.[71] To combat further unrest, the Nepali government should first adopt legislation guided by international case law, such as Sanchez and Bejarano, that asserts digital protest reserves the same rights as physical protest and mandates governments to inform its citizens of why media blackouts are occurring.[72] Next, it should implement legal frameworks modeled around Articles 19 and 21 of the ICCPR into its legislation, requiring any restriction on digital expression or assembly to adhere to necessity and proportionality standards and be narrowly tailored to the state interest.[73] Additionally, Nepal should adopt legislation that mirrors the Rabat Plan of Action to assess when government intervention is justified versus when it is an abuse on speech rights.[74] Finally, the UN should implement a measure comparable to the EU’s Article 7 proceedings, allowing for sanctions when a member state repeatedly violates the ICCPR.[75] The ability to suspend voting rights in a multinational body may serve as a powerful deterrent from continued infringements on freedom of expression. The outcome in Nepal serves as a warning to international and regional governing bodies: without stricter adherence to international legal principles and tighter regulations against abusive governments, curbing online discourse under the guise of national security serves only to further destabilize governance.
IV. Conclusion
The 2025 Nepali uprising is an example of how crucial digital spaces are, by bringing to light that the right to protest now transcends physical spaces.[76] Digital spaces have become fundamental to and are increasingly the birthplace of democratic engagement, yet governments continue to treat them as spaces to be controlled rather than forums for expression.[77] Existing frameworks, such as the ICCPR, ECHR, Article 7 of the EU, and the EMFA, all provide seemingly robust protections on paper, but their enforcement remains inconsistent and is easily undermined by government reliance on national security interests.[78] To ensure democracy is protected in an era where discourse shifts between digital and physical spaces, states and international institutions must reaffirm that digital speech is political assembly and reserves the same rights.[79] Restrictions must be closely governed, evidence-based, and transparent.[80] Without this change, governments will continue to abuse national security exceptions to silence citizens, which, as demonstrated by Nepal, may result in heightened public backlash and even governmental collapse.[81]
[1] Charlotte Scar & Simon Fraser, Nepal Parliament set on Fire After PM resigns over anti-corruption protests, BBC News (Sep. 9, 2025), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0m4vjwrdwgo [https://perma.cc/D23Q-FJE7].
[2] Everything You Need to Know About Nepal’s Gen Z: Rising Youth Challenge Corruption, Social Media Shutdown, and Inequality, Nepal News (Sept. 8, 2025) [hereinafter Nepal’s Gen Z], https://english.nepalnews.com/s/explainers/everything-you-need-to-know-about-nepals-gen-z-rising-youth-challenge-corruption-social-media-shutdown-and-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/VYM8-M3SM].
[3] Samiksha Basnet, Nepal and the Wider Problem of National Security as a Cover for Censorship, Tech Policy Press (Oct. 1, 2025), https://www.techpolicy.press/nepal-and-the-wider-problem-of-national-security-as-a-cover-for-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/4MN4-RN93].
[4] Nepal’s Gen Z, supra note 2.
[5] Brett Solomon, The Right to Protest Migration Online, Access Now (Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.accessnow.org/right-to-protest-migration-online/ [https://perma.cc/DX66-WHGU].
[6] Zselyke Csaky, The EU and the Rule of Law: Much Movement, Little Change, Ctr. for Eur. Reform (Oct. 7, 2024), https://www.cer.eu/insights/eu-and-rule-law-much-movement-little-change [https://perma.cc/Y5Y2-39R5]; see also EU: Use Article 7 Now to Protect European Values, Hum. Rts. Watch (June 18, 2021), https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/18/eu-use-article-7-now-protect-european-values [https://perma.cc/TW4F-5EEN].
[7] Solomon, supra note 5.
[8] Darrell M. West, How Technology Is Altering Citizen Protests, Brookings Inst., (Sep. 30, 2025), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-technology-is-altering-citizen-protests/ [https://perma.cc/NQC2-NAR7].
[9] Felicia Anthonio et al., #KeepItOn 2021 Elections Watch, Access Now (April 25, 2023), https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-2021-elections-watch/ [https://perma.cc/6UFH-6E7H].
[10] Kian Vesteinsson & Grant Baker, Freedom on the Net 2025: An Uncertain Future for the Global Internet, Freedom House (2025), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2025/uncertain-future-global-internet [https://perma.cc/3N7E-Q5KM].
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Barbara Ortutay, Nepal Protests: Censorship and Social Media Shutdowns Intensity, AP News (Sept. 9, 2025), https://apnews.com/article/nepal-censorship-social-media-e111d7de4ac8223088159182c664d1f2 [https://perma.cc/5V7P-6J3E].
[14] Nepal’s Gen Z, supra note 2.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Scar & Fraser, supra note 1.
[19] Ortutay, supra note 13.
[20] Id.
[21] Nepal’s Gen Z, supra note 2.
[22] Scar & Fraser, supra note 1.
[23] Id.
[24] Gopal Sharma & Aftab Ahmed, Former Chief Justice Karki Named Nepal’s First Female PM After Violent Unrest, Reuters (Sep. 12, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/former-chief-justice-karki-named-nepals-first-female-pm-after-violent-unrest-2025-09-12/ [https://perma.cc/Q34Z-ZFEV].
[25] Amnesty International, Türkiye: Crackdown on Freedom of Expression and Assembly Exposes Troubling Pattern of Police Violence (Sep. 10, 2025), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2025/09/turkiye-crackdown-on-freedom-of-expression-and-assembly-exposes-troubling-pattern-of-police-violence/ [https://perma.cc/GC68-RUTC].
[26] Id.
[27] Between 2016 and 2023, India issued 651 internet shutdowns, accounting for over half of shutdowns globally. See Marika Miner, The Worrying Trend of Internet Shutdowns in India, Univ. of Cal. Inst.. on Glob. Conflict and Coop. (June 15, 2023), https://ucigcc.org/blog/the-worrying-trend-of-internet-shutdowns-in-india/ [https://perma.cc/F7A6-NJHG]; see also Anthonio et al., supra note 9.
[28] Anthonio et al., supra note 9.
[29] Anthonio et al., supra note 9; see also West, supra note 8.
[30] Nepal’s Gen Z, supra note 2.
[31]Protect the Protest, Amnesty Int’l https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/freedom-of-expression/protest/ [https://perma.cc/U5E4-Y3SU] (last visited Oct. 28, 2025).
[32] Id.
[33] G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
[34] Id. at art. 21.
[35] Id. at art. 19, 21.
[36] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
[37] Id.
[38] ICCPR, supra note 33 at art. 19; ECHR, supra note 36.
[39] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 7, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 [hereinafter Treaty on European Union].
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[42] ICCPR, supra note 33 at art. 19, 21; ECHR, supra note 36; Treaty on European Union, supra note 39.
[43] Basnet, supra note 3.
[44] Id.
[45] Scar & Fraser, supra note 1.
[46] ICCPR, supra note 33 at art. 19; ECHR, supra note 36.
[47] ICCPR, supra note 33 at art. 19; ECHR, supra note 36.
[48] Basnet, supra note 3.
[49] Nepal’s Gen Z, supra note 2.
[50]U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984).
[51] The Johannesburg Principles are an addition to the ICCPR written to provide guidance on balancing national security interests and the freedom of expression. Although the principles are non-binding, they serve as an international guidepost for determining when restrictions on expression are improper. ARTICLE 19, The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (Nov. 1995), https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/joburg-principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED3L-8LN3].
[52] Nepal’s Gen Z, supra note 2.
[53] NEPAL: Ensure accountability for protest crackdown, halt digital repression and police excess, Forum Asia (Sept. 9, 2025), https://forum-asia.org/nepal-protest-crackdown/ [https://perma.cc/9AF4-29P5].
[54]Sanchez v. France, App. No. 45581/15 (May 15, 2023), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/?i=001-224928 [https://perma.cc/2D7B-N5QM]; ECHR, supra note 36.
[55] Sanchez, App. No. 45581/15.
[56] Id.
[57] Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sept. 20, 2023, Sentencia T-372, Bejarano Ricaurte and Others v. Ministry of Defense and Others (Colom.).
[58] Id.
[59] Id.
[60] Solomon, supra note 5.
[61] Nepal’s Gen Z, supra note 2.
[62] Vesteinsson, supra note 10.
[63] U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/22/17/Add.4 (Jan. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Annual Report].
[64] Id.
[65] Basnet, supra note 3.
[66] U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/74/486 (Oct. 9, 2019).
[67] Id.
[68] Treaty on European Union, supra note 39.
[69] Treaty on European Union, supra note 39.
[70] Nepal’s Gen Z, supra note 2.
[71] Scar, supra note 1.
[72] Sanchez, App. No. 45581/15; Bejarano, Sentencia T-372.
[73] ICCPR, supra note 33 at art. 19, 21.
[74] Annual Report, supra note 63.
[75] Treaty on European Union, supra note 39.
[76] Solomon, supra note 5.
[77] Id.
[78] Csaky, supra note 6.
[79] Solomon, supra note 5.
[80] Annual Report, supra note 63.
[81] Basnet, supra note 3.
