{"id":138,"date":"2019-05-06T19:42:22","date_gmt":"2019-05-06T23:42:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/?p=138"},"modified":"2019-05-06T19:42:22","modified_gmt":"2019-05-06T23:42:22","slug":"unconstitutional-vagueness-in-view-of-the-grave-nature-of-deportation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/2019\/05\/06\/unconstitutional-vagueness-in-view-of-the-grave-nature-of-deportation\/","title":{"rendered":"Unconstitutional Vagueness: In View of the Grave Nature of Deportation"},"content":{"rendered":"

Vagueness doctrine has primarily been used as a tool for defendants to challenge their convictions or\u00a0arrests.[1]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup>\u00a0Its core value is that laws should \u201cgive the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act\u00a0accordingly.\u201d[2]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> Two separate justifications backed up this doctrine: first, that the most severe deprivations of liberty can be rightfully implemented only after proper notice (the \u201cnotice\u201d component), and second, that the legislature abdicates its responsibility in passing loosely drafted statutes and grants outsized rulemaking power to courts (the \u201cseparation of powers\u201d\u00a0component).[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> The plurality in\u00a0the instant case focused on the notice component. Once one concedes that deportation is functionally as severe as\u00a0imprisonment, a rigorous application of the vagueness test is necessary.[4]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

The Background of the Instant Case<\/strong><\/p>\n

James Dimaya, a native of the Philippines, lawfully entered the United States in 1992 and lived in California as a legal permanent\u00a0resident.[5]<\/a><\/sup> <\/sup>He was twice convicted of first-degree residential burglary, first in 2007, then again in 2009, and sentenced to a two-year prison term for\u00a0each offense.[6]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> Under California law, burglary is defined as entering any of a list of dwellings \u201cwith intent to commit\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. any\u00a0felony.\u201d[7]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup>\u00a0In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against\u00a0Dimaya.[8]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

Under the INA, an alien is subject to removal if he is \u201cconvicted of an aggravated felony at any time after\u00a0admission.\u201d[9]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup>\u00a0The statute defines \u201caggravated felony\u201d by pointing to the criminal code, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a016, and its definition of \u201ccrime of\u00a0violence.\u201d[10]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup>\u00a0Under \u00a7\u00a016(b), the \u201cresidual clause,\u201d \u201cany other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense\u201d constitutes a crime of\u00a0violence.[11]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

DHS sought Dimaya\u2019s removal under \u00a7\u00a016(b), arguing burglary inherently involved substantial risk of physical force and thus was grounds for\u00a0removal.<\/a>[12]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The immigration judge (IJ) agreed, finding that California\u2019s burglary statute, which required entry into a residence, dealt with crimes that \u201cby [their] very nature\u201d likely create risk of\u00a0violence.[13]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> Because the crime satisfied \u00a7\u00a016(b), the IJ ordered Dimaya\u00a0deported.[14]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)\u00a0affirmed.[15]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

Dimaya appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the BIA had erred in classifying California burglary as a \u00a7\u00a016(b) crime of\u00a0violence.[16]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided\u00a0 Johnson v. United States<\/em>, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).[17]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> There, the Court addressed the Armed Career Criminal\u00a0Act\u2019s[18]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> (ACCA) definition of \u201cviolent felony,\u201d which \u2014 like the statute at issue in\u00a0Dimaya<\/em>\u00a0\u2014 included a residual clause, encompassing any crime that \u201cotherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to\u00a0another.\u201d[19]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

The Court held that this residual clause violated the Fifth Amendment\u2019s due process requirement by \u201cden[ying] fair notice to defendants and invit[ing] arbitrary enforcement by\u00a0judges.\u201d[20]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/a> It was unconstitutionally vague and thus\u00a0void.[21]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> In light of the Court\u2019s holding in\u00a0Johnson<\/em>, the Ninth Circuit ordered supplemental briefing and arguments on the question of whether \u00a7\u00a016(b), too, was unconstitutionally\u00a0vague.[22]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

The Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed the\u00a0BIA.[23]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> Judge\u00a0Reinhardt[24]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup>, writing for the panel, first explained that both Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent supported applying vagueness doctrine to deportation proceedings because of the \u201charsh consequences\u00a0attached.\u201d[25]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> Then, having affirmed that the INA was subject to\u00a0Johnson<\/em>\u2019s vagueness inquiry, Judge Reinhardt compared \u00a7\u00a016(b) to ACCA\u2019s infirm language, concluding that the two clauses were similar in all relevant ways, making \u00a7\u00a016(b) unconstitutional just as ACCA\u00a0was.[26]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court\u00a0affirmed.[27]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> Writing for the Court, Justice\u00a0Kagan[28]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup>\u00a0held \u00a7\u00a016(b) unconstitutionally\u00a0vague.[29]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

What is the Government\u2019s Argument?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Government identified three textual discrepancies between ACCA’s residual clause and\u00a0Section 16(b)\u00a0that it claimed make\u00a0Section 16(b) easier to apply and thus cure the constitutional infirmity.[30]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

First, the Government argued that\u00a0Section 16(b)\u2019s express requirement (absent from ACCA) that the risk arise from acts taken \u201cin the course of committing the offense,\u201d serves as a \u201ctemporal restriction\u201d \u2014 in other words, a court applying\u00a0Section 16(B) may not \u201cconsider risks arising\u00a0after<\/em>\u00a0\u201d the offense\u2019s commission is over.[31]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

Second,\u00a0the Government says that the\u00a0Section 16(b)\u00a0inquiry, which focuses on the risk of \u201cphysical force,\u201d \u201ctrains solely\u201d on the conduct typically involved in a crime.[32]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup>\u00a0In contrast, ACCA\u2019s residual clause asked about the risk of \u201cphysical injury,\u201d requiring a second inquiry into a speculative \u201cchain of causation that could possibly result in a victim\u2019s injury.\u201d[33]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

Third,\u00a0the Government notes that\u00a0Section 16(b) avoids the vagueness of ACCA\u2019s residual clause because it is not preceded by a \u201cconfusing list of exemplar crimes.\u201d[34]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

Additionally, the Government also relies on judicial experience with\u00a0Section 16(b), arguing that because it has divided lower courts less often and resulted in only one certiorari grant, it must be clearer than its ACCA counterpart.[35]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court did not agree with the Government\u2019s arguments <\/strong><\/p>\n

The residual clause of \u00a716(b), defines a \u201ccrime of violence\u201d as\u00a0\u201cany other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.\u201d[36]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

To decide whether a person’s conviction falls within the scope of that clause, courts apply the categorical approach.[37]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> This approach has courts ask not whether \u201cthe particular facts\u201d underlying a conviction created a substantial risk, nor whether the statutory elements of a crime require the creation of such a risk in each and every case, but whether \u201cthe ordinary case\u201d of an offense poses the requisite risk.<\/p>\n

To begin,\u00a0the Court first estimated ACCA\u2019s residual clause, and found it created \u201cgrave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime\u201d because it \u201ctie[d] the judicial assessment\u00a0of risk\u201d to a speculative hypothesis about the crime’s \u201cordinary case,\u201d but provided no guidance on how to figure out what that ordinary case was.[38]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup>\u00a0Compounding that uncertainty,\u00a0the Court found ACCA\u2019s residual clause layered an imprecise \u201cserious potential risk\u201d standard on top of the requisite \u201cordinary case\u201d inquiry.[39]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

The combination of \u201cindeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime and indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony,\u201d\u00a0resulted in \u201cmore unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.\u201d[40]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> The Court found that Section 16(b) suffers from those same two flaws.[41]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

Like ACCA’s residual clause,\u00a0Section 16(b) calls for a court to identify a crime\u2019s \u201cordinary case\u201d in order to measure the crime\u2019s risk but \u201coffers no reliable way\u201d to discern what the ordinary version of any offense looks like.[42]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> And its \u201csubstantial risk\u201d threshold is no more determinate than ACCA\u2019s \u201cserious potential risk\u201d standard. Thus, the same \u201c[t]wo features\u201d that \u201cconspire[d] to make\u201d ACCA\u2019s residual clause unconstitutionally vague also exist in\u00a0Section 16(b) with the same result.[43]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Regarding the Government\u2019s arguments, the Court found them unpersuasive.\u00a0Johnson<\/em>\u00a0found the statute impermissibly vague, and the legislature must make the statutory inquiry more determinate in order to remain constitutional.[44]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

As for the first argument, the Court disagreed with it and pointed out that it is not a meaningful limitation: In the ordinary case of any offense, the riskiness of a crime arises from events occurring during its commission, not events occurring later.[45]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> So with or without the temporal language, a court applying the ordinary case approach, whether in\u00a0Section 16\u2019s or ACCA\u2019s residual clause, would do the same thing\u2014ask what usually happens when a crime is committed.[46]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> The phrase \u201cin the course of\u201d makes no difference as to either outcome or clarity and cannot cure the statute\u2019s indeterminacy\u00a0Johnson<\/em>\u00a0described.[47]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

As for the second argument made by the Government, the Court made it clear that \u201cphysical force\u201d means \u201cforce capable of causing physical pain or injury.\u201d[48]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup>\u00a0Therefore, under\u00a0Section 16(b) a court must not only identify the conduct typically involved in a crime, but also gauge its potential consequences. Thus, the force\/injury distinction does not clarify a court’s analysis of whether a crime qualifies as violent.[49]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

Finally, the Court found those enumerated crimes, which listed in Section 16(b) were in fact too varied to assist this Court in giving ACCA\u2019s residual clause meaning.[50]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> To say that they failed to resolve the clause\u2019s vagueness is hardly to\u00a0say they caused the problem.[51]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

Moreover, the Court found that, in fact,\u00a0a host of issues respecting\u00a0Section 16(b)\u2019s application to specific crimes divide the federal appellate courts.[52]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> And while this Court has only heard oral arguments in two\u00a0Section 16(b)\u00a0cases, this Court vacated the judgments in a number of other\u00a0Section 16(b)\u00a0cases, remanding them for further consideration in light of ACCA decisions.[53]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup><\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the whole, Justice Kagan\u2019s diagnosis was accurate: \u201cJohnson<\/em>[was] a straightforward decision, with equally straightforward application\u201d in\u00a0Dimaya<\/em>.[54]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup> Once the Court had done the analysis in\u00a0Johnson<\/em>, the only real question in\u00a0Dimaya<\/em>\u00a0was whether or not the Court would extend this due process protection to deportation cases. Because the Court has previously acknowledged that deportation is just as severe as\u00a0incarceration,[55]<\/a><\/sup><\/sup>\u00a0justice demanded\u00a0Johnson<\/em>\u2019s application here.<\/p>\n

Narrow though it is, the Court\u2019s opinion could, if wielded by a deregulation-minded majority, do dramatic damage to the administrative state. While vagueness doctrine properly applies to civil deprivations that closely resemble criminal ones, the doctrine could easily be extended too far, doing violence to regulatory schemes that require some degree of vagueness to be effective, but that do not deprive individuals of their liberty in the same urgent way. Perhaps what is most important about\u00a0Dimaya<\/em>\u00a0is what it did\u00a0not<\/em>\u00a0do: it failed to give future courts binding precedent about how the vagueness doctrine should be extended (or not) going forward.<\/p>\n

Although the Court made the important move of applying\u00a0Johnson<\/em>\u00a0to a civil law, it failed to agree on\u00a0why<\/em>\u00a0it chose to do so and what that means for future cases. If, going forward, the Court hopes to protect vagueness doctrine from the type of foundation-shifting expansion that Justice Gorsuch advocated in\u00a0Dimaya<\/em>, it ought to develop a robust test for determining where and how it will apply the vagueness doctrine outside of the criminal and removal contexts.<\/p>\n

Ad hoc extension of vagueness doctrine could create arbitrary and unpredictable outcomes in individual cases \u2014 exactly what the doctrine is trying to prevent. The Court should look to its procedural due process precedent to develop a standard against which to judge the relative severity of various deprivations. In those cases, the Court has drawn precisely the lines Justice Gorsuch\u2019s concurrence challenged the Court to draw and provided the Court with ample analogies against which to measure civil harms when determining their severity.<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. See\u00a0Andrew E. Goldsmith,\u00a0The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30\u00a0Am. J. Crim. L.\u00a0279, 280 (2003) (\u201cFor more than 125 years, the Supreme Court has evaluated defendants\u2019 claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u201d). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  2. \u00a0Id<\/em>.\u00a0at 284 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  3. Id<\/em>.\u00a0at 284\u201385.\u00a0 \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  4. See Sessions v. Dimaya<\/em>, 138 S. Ct. at 1213, 200 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2018)(plurality opinion) (citing\u00a0De George<\/em>, 341 U.S. at 231). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  5. Dimaya v. Lynch<\/em>, 803 F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015).\u00a0 \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  6. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  7. Id.\u00a0<\/em>at 1118 (quoting\u00a0Cal. Penal Code\u00a0\u00a7\u00a0459 (West 2017)). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  8. Id<\/em>.\u00a0at 1111. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  9. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a01227(a)(2)(A)(iii). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  10. Id<\/em>.\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01101(a)(43)(F).\u00a0 \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  11. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a016(b) (2012).\u00a0 \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  12. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a01101(a)(43)(F). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  13. Id.<\/em>\u00a0at 1112 (quoting IJ opinion).\u00a0 \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  14. Id.\u00a0<\/em>The INA also requires that a crime of violence carry a term of imprisonment of at least one year, which Dimaya\u2019s did. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a01101(a)(43)(F). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  15. Dimaya,<\/em> 803 F.3d at 1112. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  16. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  17. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  18. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a0924 (2012). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  19. Id<\/em>.\u00a0\u00a7\u00a0924(e)(2)(B)(ii). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  20. Johnson v. United States<\/em>, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  21. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  22. Dimaya<\/em>, 803 F.3d at 1112. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  23. Id<\/em>.\u00a0at 1111. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  24. Judge Reinhardt was joined by Judge Wardlaw. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  25. Dimaya<\/em>, 803 F.3d at 1113 (quoting Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1042 (9th Cir. 2013)). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  26. See\u00a0id.\u00a0<\/em>at 1114\u201317. Judge Callahan, writing in dissent, disagreed that the \u201ctwin concerns\u201d from\u00a0Johnson\u201cinfect[ed]\u201d \u00a7\u00a016(b).\u00a0See\u00a0id.\u00a0<\/em>at 1120 (Callahan, J., dissenting). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  27. Sessions<\/em>, 138 S. Ct. at 1223. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  28. Justice Kagan wrote for the Court with respect to Parts I, III, IV-B, and V; she was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Gorsuch. She also delivered an opinion for Parts II and IV-A, where she was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  29. Sessions<\/em>, 138 S. Ct. at 1210.\u00a0 \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  30. Id<\/em>. at 1208. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  31. Id. <\/em> \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  32. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  33. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  34. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  35. Id<\/em>. at 1209. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  36. Id<\/em>. at 1207. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  37. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  38. Id<\/em>. at 1207-1208. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  39. Id<\/em>. at 1208. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  40. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  41. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  42. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  43. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  44. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  45. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  46. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  47. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  48. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  49. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  50. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  51. Id<\/em>. at 1208-1209. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  52. Id<\/em>. at 1209. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  53. Id<\/em>. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  54. Id.<\/em>\u00a0at 1213 (majority opinion). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  55. See, e.g.<\/em>, Jordan v. De George, <\/em>341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan<\/em>, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Vagueness doctrine has primarily been used as a tool for defendants to challenge their convictions or\u00a0arrests.[1]\u00a0Its core value is that laws should \u201cgive the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act\u00a0accordingly.\u201d[2] Two separate justifications backed up this doctrine: first, that the most severe deprivations of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":31,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,4],"tags":[30],"class_list":{"0":"post-138","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-constitutional-law","7":"category-immigration-law","8":"tag-vagueness-doctrine","9":"czr-hentry"},"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/138","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/31"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=138"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/138\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":139,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/138\/revisions\/139"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=138"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=138"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=138"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}