{"id":580,"date":"2025-03-14T14:03:26","date_gmt":"2025-03-14T18:03:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/?p=580"},"modified":"2025-03-14T14:03:26","modified_gmt":"2025-03-14T18:03:26","slug":"proving-their-identity-the-u-k-s-unfair-burden-on-lgbtqi-asylum-seekers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/2025\/03\/14\/proving-their-identity-the-u-k-s-unfair-burden-on-lgbtqi-asylum-seekers\/","title":{"rendered":"Proving Their Identity: The U.K.\u2019s Unfair Burden on LGBTQI+ Asylum Seekers"},"content":{"rendered":"

Will Gronefeld, Associate Member, Immigration and Human Rights Law Review<\/em><\/p>\n

\"\"
LGBTQI+ asylum seekers faces significant challenges in the UK. Image: Ian Taylor\/Unsplash<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

I. Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

In 2023, sixty-four United Nations (U.N.) member states considered it a crime to be a member of the LGBTQI+ community.[1]<\/a> Since 1951, international law has protected the rights of individuals within persecuted social groups to seek refuge.[2]<\/a> The United Kingdom (U.K.) ranked fifth in the number of asylum claims received compared to other European Union countries in 2023.[3]<\/a> In response to the growing number of asylum claims, the U.K. introduced the Nationality and Borders Act, which violates obligations under by imposing severe limitations on the fundamental right to seek asylum.[4]<\/a> Furthermore, this law is largely ineffective, as its initiative to cut down on the asylum backlog has merely resulted in a large number of lengthy and costly appeals.[5]<\/a> This blog explores the U.K.\u2019s targeting of LGBTQI+ asylum seekers, specifically through the Nationality and Borders Act. Part II provides background on U.K.\u2019s asylum laws leading up to and after the passage of the Nationality and Borders Act. Part III discusses how the Act violates international laws, evaluates its high evidentiary standards, the ineffectiveness of appeals as a solution, and examines nonprofit organizations that seek to reform U.K. asylum law. The Nationality and Borders Act not only severely undermines the fundamental right to seek asylum but further marginalize and stigmatize the already vulnerable population of LGBTQI+ asylum seekers by imposing strict evidentiary requirements and constructing high procedural barriers.<\/p>\n

II. Background: U.K.\u2019s Asylum Restrictions Targeting LGBTQI+ Seekers<\/strong><\/p>\n

A. U.K. Asylum Law Leading Up to The Nationality and Borders Act<\/u><\/p>\n

Established in 1782, the Home Office is the U.K.\u2019s primary agency to adjudicate and oversee immigration, and eventually asylum, claims.[6]<\/a> The right to asylum in the U.K. arose following World War II and the creation of the 1951 Refugee Convention.[7]<\/a> This Convention outlines protections for individuals fleeing their home countries and seeking refuge elsewhere.[8]<\/a> In 1993, the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act explicitly incorporated the 1951 Refugee Convention into U.K. law.[9]<\/a> In 1999, the Immigration and Asylum Act differentiated the social group of individuals seeking asylum from those seeking refugee status and overhauled existing benefits for U.K. asylees.[10]<\/a> For example, the Home Office was newly responsible for housing and financially supporting individuals in the asylum system.[11]<\/a> Further, the Home Office no longer permitted asylum seekers to work within the U.K. and instead it provided a small monthly stipend.[12]<\/a><\/p>\n

Throughout the late 1990s and 2000s, the U.K.\u2019s asylum system became increasingly restrictive.[13]<\/a> For example, the Asylum and Immigration Act of 2004 reduced benefits, such as refusing support to asylum seekers with minor codependents and replaced back payments and other benefits to refugees with a loan system.[14]<\/a> Additionally, in 2014, the Immigration Act sought to expand the government\u2019s powers to detain and deport asylum seekers.[15]<\/a> This Act not only expanded the government\u2019s power, but also heavily restricted the rights of noncitizens in the U.K., revoking driving privileges and the ability to rent property, and restricting access to benefits such as free healthcare.[16]<\/a> In addition to navigating the continual changes to U.K\u2019s asylum laws, individuals seeking asylum for fear of persecution in their home countries, including for membership to a particular social group such as the LGBTQI+, must prove their fear is well-founded.\u00a0 [17]<\/a><\/p>\n

In 2002, Sivakumaran, R (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department<\/em> established the initial standard of determining whether asylum seekers\u2019 fear of persecution in their home countries is well-founded.[18]<\/a> In Sivakumaran,<\/em> six Tamil individuals from Sri Lanka applied for asylum in the U.K. because they feared racial persecution.[19]<\/a> The Secretary of State for U.K.\u2019s Home Department rejected their applications, but the individuals were granted leave for judicial review.[20]<\/a> The Court of Appeal, using the perspective of a person of \u201creasonable courage in the applicant\u2019s situation,\u201d reversed the judgment, finding the refugees proved their \u201cwell-founded fear\u201d by proving actual fear of persecution in conjunction with a good reason for the fear.[21]<\/a> The House of Lords ultimately held that a \u201cwell-founded fear\u201d should be assessed objectively, requiring an applicant to show there is a reasonable likelihood that they would face persecution if returned to their country.[22]<\/a> This decision excluded paranoid fear but allowed for fears which have been objectively shown to be misconceived.[23]<\/a> The U.K.\u2019s immigration and asylum system followed the standard established by Sivakumaran<\/em> until the passage of the Nationality and Borders Act.<\/p>\n

B. Nationality and Borders Act<\/u><\/p>\n

In April 2022, U.K.\u2019s government passed the Nationality and Borders Act (NABA).[24]<\/a> This legislation sought to overhaul the U.K.\u2019s asylum system by differentiating refugees through a two-tiered system, separating individuals into Group One and Group Two.[25]<\/a> Group One refugees are those who arrive in the U.K. \u201cdirectly from a country or territory where their life or freedom was threatened, have presented themselves to the authorities without delay or where a refugee has entered or is present in the U.K. unlawfully, they can show good cause for their unlawful entry or presence.\u201d[26]<\/a> Group Two refugees are those who do not fit into Group One, such as asylum seekers who arrive by boat, lorry, or other irregular routes through a third country.[27]<\/a> This means that Group Two refugees may find their applications denied.[28]<\/a> This violates Article 1(a)(2) of the refugee convention, which treats all asylum seekers as equal, regardless of their origin or country transited. [29]<\/a>These classifications have been indefinitely \u201cpaused\u201d since July 2023 but can be reignited at any moment.[30]<\/a><\/p>\n

In addition to the establishment of refugee classifications, the NABA places a much higher standard of proof on asylum seekers.[31]<\/a> Section 32(2) overturned Sivakumaran<\/em> and created a two-part test to determine whether an asylum seekers\u2019 fear is well-founded.[32]<\/a> This \u201cbalance of probabilities\u201d test looks to whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which would cause them to fear persecution, such as race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.[33]<\/a> The test then looks to whether the asylee does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality as a result of that characteristic.[34]<\/a> Thus, for asylum claims made on or after June 28, 2022, individuals must prove that it is \u201cmore likely than not\u201d that they have a characteristic causing them to fear persecution.[35]<\/a><\/p>\n

The queerphobic behavior exhibited in asylum interviews, court hearings, and translated materials exacerbates asylee\u2019s difficulty in proving their claims.[36]<\/a> For example, some asylum seekers reported interpreters refusing to translate \u201cgay\u201d and \u201cbisexual,\u201d not understanding basic concepts of sexual diversity, and perpetuating abuse such as assault.[37]<\/a> As a result of language barriers, with only the translator conversing with the asylee, other court personnel are not fully aware of the asylee\u2019s story.[38]<\/a> Additionally, LGBTQI+ asylum seekers are often placed in unsafe Home Office housing accommodations.[39]<\/a> LGBTQI+ asylum seekers are often housed alongside people from the communities they are trying to escape.[40]<\/a> For example, one transgender asylum seeker was threatened with a knife by another resident.[41]<\/a> The individual had his phone smashed and was unable to call the police.[42]<\/a> After the incident, the housing provider took no action to safeguard the victim and even classified it as a \u201chousehold spat.\u201d[43]<\/a> Other LGBTQI+ asylum seekers reported sleeping with a knife under their pillow for safety and housing staff using confidential records to harass them.[44]<\/a> The Refugee Convention sets standards not only for refugees entering the country, but also for those leaving.[45]<\/a> The U.K., however, has blatantly violated both standards.[46]<\/a> The NABA\u2019s strict standards exacerbate these violations by indirectly limiting the opportunity to appeal and restricting the potential for reform.[47]<\/a><\/p>\n

III. Discussion<\/strong><\/p>\n

LGBTQI+ asylum seekers are particularly vulnerable within the already fragile population of asylum seekers.[48]<\/a> While international law has long acknowledged the lack of evidence typically provided by asylum seekers, the NABA imposes an unreasonably high evidentiary standard.[49]<\/a> Instead of achieving its intended goal of streamlining the asylum system, the NABA has flooded courts with appeals.[50]<\/a> However, there are groups that continue to advocate for reform, even as the U.K. reaffirms the face of the NABA.[51]<\/a><\/p>\n

A. International Law Violations<\/u><\/p>\n

The U.K.\u2019s practice of targeting LGBTQI+ asylum seekers violates several international treaty obligations. As a signatory to the Refugee Convention of 1951, the U.K. must abide by certain legal principles for the protection of refugees.[52]<\/a> Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention establishes that the term refugee applies to anyone with a \u201cwell-founded\u201d fear of persecution.[53]<\/a> However, subsequent caselaw and directives have shown that this definition is meant to be a generous standard.[54]<\/a> For example, the U. S. Supreme Court held that a well-founded fear can be established with less than a 50% probability of future persecution.[55]<\/a> Additionally, the Home Office has directly stated that the amount of documentary evidence in LGBTQI+ cases is often limited, forcing asylee testimony to be key evidence.[56]<\/a> In the past, the U.K. has recognized that placing a harsh evidentiary standard for asylum seekers often has adverse effects.[57]<\/a> Most notably, the 2010 U.K. Supreme Court case HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department <\/em>recognized that requiring \u201can applicant to engage in self-denial was to require him to live in a state of self-induced oppression.\u201d[58]<\/a> Lastly, the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees decided that well-founded fear should be determined under a \u201creasonable\u201d probability standard.[59]<\/a><\/p>\n

The U.N. International Commission on Refugees advised that the NABA would depart from well-established principles of U.K. law by importing the higher standard of proof used in civil litigation into the refugee determination process.[60]<\/a> This higher standard constructs an even higher wall for asylum seekers to climb.[61]<\/a>\u00a0 The UNCHR handbook emphasizes that asylum claims should be determined in \u201ca spirt of justice and understanding. [62]<\/a> This includes recognizing the enormous evidentiary standard, giving the benefit of the doubt when appropriate, and providing support such as trauma sensitive interviews.[63]<\/a> \u00a0However, the NABA imposes strict requirements that force asylum seekers to engage in more detailed discussions of traumatic experiences during interviews but makes much more legitimate claims unsuccessful due to the difficulty of asylees bringing evidence with them.[64]<\/a><\/p>\n

B. Evidentiary Requirements<\/u><\/p>\n

LGBTQI+ asylum seekers face a nearly insurmountable wall to overcome when seeking asylum for fear of persecution.[65]<\/a> Typically, asylee\u2019s testimony is the only available evidence to prove their case.[66]<\/a> Most LGBTQI+ cannot live openly as queer individuals due to violence or persecution, which makes the evidentiary requirements particularly harsh.[67]<\/a> For example, one bisexual man from Ghana could only rely on his testimony as he could not live his sexuality openly.[68]<\/a> Another man from Ethiopia wondered how he would prove he is gay if his own parents did not believe him: he pondered how would he prove it to \u201csomeone who has a different culture to me, who doesn\u2019t understand the language and the syntax, who doesn\u2019t understand where I come from.\u201d[69]<\/a> Adding to the complexity of LGBTQI+ asylum seekers\u2019 difficulty in proving their case under NABA is the inherent difficulty that asylum seekers face when explaining their story to someone from a different culture, who likely speaks a different language, and who has limited time to make a judgment.[70]<\/a> The NABA does not seek to overhaul the system but rather perpetuate a hostile environment for asylum seekers in the U.K., especially those within the LGBTQI+ community.[71]<\/a> These evidentiary requirements force LGBTQI+ asylum seekers to display a specific view of queerness based on outdated stereotypes, yet at the same time are forced to make their queerness invisible to avoid harm.[72]<\/a><\/p>\n

C. Appeals<\/u><\/p>\n

The justifications for U.K. asylum laws, such as the NABA, come from the government\u2019s concern of an overwhelmed and underfunded asylum system that would \u201cdestabilize society.\u201d[73]<\/a> In 2023, then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak pledged to process more than 90,000 old asylum claims by the end of the year.[74]<\/a> As a result, the government focused its efforts on quantity over quality. With the U.K.\u2019s focus homed in on simply eliminating the number of open asylum claims, both LGBTQI+ individuals and the government\u2019s incentive suffered.[75]<\/a> The Home Office sampled numerous cases as part of an internal quality assurance process.[76]<\/a> In 2023 through 2024, only 52% of asylum decisions sampled met the quality standards, compared to 72% the previous year.[77]<\/a> Consequently, the number of appeals has ballooned, rising from 9,000 to 29,000.[78]<\/a> Nearly 9,000 appeals were filed between April and June 2024 alone.[79]<\/a> Asylum seekers challenging initial decisions highlight the evidentiary issues that have a disproportionate impact on LGTBQI+ asylum seekers.[80]<\/a> \u00a0For instance, the Home Office has made factual mistakes such as failure to consider evidence, along with inaccurately translated interviews that provide a poor record of applicant\u2019s testimony. [81]<\/a><\/p>\n

The appeals process is not enough to address the inadequacies in the U.K.\u2019s asylum law system. Many asylum seekers are unable to access counsel in the U.K.[82]<\/a> The payment rates for the U.K.\u2019s legal aid are so low that most lawyers simply cannot afford to do it.[83]<\/a> As a result, solicitors must \u201ccherry-pick\u201d cases to remain financially viable.[84]<\/a> In 2024, about 57% percent, or 54,000 people, of individuals seeking asylum and\/or appealing against a refusal could not access a legal aid solicitor.[85]<\/a> Due to NABA\u2019s harsh evidentiary standards also applying to appeals, LGBTQI+ cases are more resource-intensive; thus, LGBTQI+ asylum seekers often go without legal aid in a complex and foreign system.[86]<\/a><\/p>\n

D. Reform<\/u><\/p>\n

Several groups in the U.K. have sought to help reform.[87]<\/a> Notably, the non-profit organization Rainbow Migration aims to provide practical and emotional support for LGBTQI+ asylees, along with legal information and advice. [88]<\/a> Rainbow Migration helps provide tools and support to asylum seekers needing financial aid.[89]<\/a> In addition, Rainbow Migration provides LGBTQI+ asylum seekers assistance with their claims.[90]<\/a> The evidentiary requirements place an exceptional burden on them, but volunteers can help asylees by writing supporting letters and statements.[91]<\/a> If claims go to appeal, volunteers may potentially attend the hearing as a witness and answer questions based on their supportive statement.[92]<\/a> Though effective, these efforts to reform merely curb the adverse effects of NABA, and do not address the underlying systemic issues that have resulted from the implementation of NABA.[93]<\/a><\/p>\n

IV. Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

Since its enactment in 2022, the NABA has exacerbated the marginalization and stigmatization of LGBTQI+ asylum seekers, violated their fundamental right to seek asylum by imposing strict evidentiary requirements and establishing harsh procedural barriers.[94]<\/a> Although the U.K.\u2019s asylum law prior to the NABA was increasingly restrictive, it also followed a standard for well-founded fear that adhered to the international principles established by the Refugee Convention of 1951.[95]<\/a> The passage of the NABA departed from that standard, placing a much higher burden of proof on LGBTQI+ asylum seekers while subjecting them to the same harms and marginalization they are trying to escape.[96]<\/a> These strict standards not only violate the concept of \u201cwell-founded fear\u201d outlined in Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, but they also contradict the established standard set by Sivakumaran, R (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.[97]<\/strong><\/a> <\/em>While these strict standards originate from the government\u2019s concern about an underfunded and overwhelmed asylum system, the NABA has only led to the system becoming overwhelmed by appeals that remain largely inaccessible to LGBTQI+ asylees.[98]<\/a> \u00a0<\/em>Immediate attention and rollback of the NABA is needed to protect the rights of LGBTQI+ asylum seekers and reaffirm the U.K.\u2019s commitment to humanitarian ideals.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Jamie Wareham, New Maps Show Where It\u2019s Illegal To Be LGBT In 2023<\/em>, Forbes, (Apr. 12, 2023), https:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/jamiewareham\/2023\/04\/07\/new-maps-show-where-its-illegal-to-be-lgbtq-in-2023\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/C835-ZLLK].<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> LGBTQI+ Persons<\/em>, UNHCR, https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/us\/what-we-do\/how-we-work\/safeguarding-individuals\/lgbtiq-persons [https:\/\/perma.cc\/DW2W-3KYK] (last visited Feb. 12, 2025).<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Peter William Walsh & Nuni Jorgensen, Asylum and Refugee Resettlement in the U.K.<\/em>, <\/em>The Migration observatory (July 1, 2023), https:\/\/migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk\/resources\/briefings\/migration-to-the-uk-asylum\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/LY67-3YC5].<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Nationality and Borders Act 2022, c. 36 (U.K.).<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Marley Morris, The Asylum Backlog: Job Done?, <\/em>The Inst. for Pub. Pol\u2019y Rsch, (Feb. 28, 2024), https:\/\/www.ippr.org\/articles\/the-asylum-backlog-job-done [https:\/\/perma.cc\/J8WH-GCEL].<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> David Faulkner, Continuity and Change in the Home Office, <\/em>Home Off. (1991), https:\/\/www.watersidepress.co.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/CCHO_paper.pdf [https:\/\/perma.cc\/24SB-YMSH].<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Lara Keay, What does the UN 1951 Refugee Convention say \u2013 and can you change it?<\/em>, Sky News (Sep. 26, 2023, 1:32 PM), https:\/\/news.sky.com\/story\/what-does-the-un-1951-refugee-convention-say-and-can-you-change-it-12970185# [https:\/\/perma.cc\/D3MG-EE82].<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (hereinafter Refugee Convention).<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, c. 23 (U.K.).<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Holly Grey, UK asylum policy: How did we get here?<\/em>, Refugee L. Initiative, (July 4, 2023), https:\/\/rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk\/2023\/07\/04\/uk-asylum-policy-how-did-we-get-here\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/UFG8-WAMD].<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Jim Connelly & Martin Schweiger, The health risks of the UK\u2019s new asylum act,<\/em> 321 British Med. J. 5 (July 1, 2000), https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC1127694\/pdf\/5.pdf [https:\/\/perma.cc\/4U4K-N6G8].<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> Cristina Saenz Perez, The Securitization of Asylum: A Review of UK Asylum Laws Post-Brexit<\/em>, 35 Int\u2019l J. of Refugee L. 304, 305-306 (2023).<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Betsy Reed, Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004, <\/em>The Guardian (Jan. 19, 2009), https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/commentisfree\/libertycentral\/2009\/jan\/15\/civil-liberties-immigration [https:\/\/perma.cc\/J3L8-RV66].<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> Perez, supra<\/em> note 13, at 306.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> Russell Taylor, Impact of \u2018Hostile\u2019 Environment Policy Debate on 14 June 2018 5 (House of Lords Libr. Briefing 2018), https:\/\/researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk\/documents\/LLN-2018-0064\/LLN-2018-0064.pdf [https:\/\/perma.cc\/TM3S-FCX5].<\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> Sivakumaran, R v. Sec\u2019y of State for the Home Dep\u2019t, [1987] UKHL 1 (Dec. 16, 1987).<\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> Id. <\/em>at 193.<\/p>\n

[20]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[21]<\/a> Id.<\/em>at 200.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[23]<\/a> Id. <\/em>at 195.<\/p>\n

[24]<\/a> Nationality and Borders Act 2022, c. 36 (U.K.).<\/p>\n

[25]<\/a> Differential treatment (Clause 11 of the Nationality and Borders Act), <\/em>Refugee Council (Nov. 29, 2023), https:\/\/www.refugeecouncil.org.uk\/information\/refugee-asylum-facts\/differential-treatment-clause-11\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/8FAP-GXQN].<\/p>\n

[26]<\/a> Nationality and Borders Act 2022, c. 11 (U.K.).<\/p>\n

[27]<\/a> Differential treatment (Clause 11 of the Nationality and Borders Act)<\/em>, supra<\/em> note 24.<\/p>\n

[28]<\/a> Perez, supra<\/em> note 13, at 306.<\/p>\n

[29]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[30]<\/a> Peter William Walsh & Madeleine Sumpton, UK policies to deter people from claiming asylum, <\/em>The Migration Observatory (Jan. 23, 2024), https:\/\/migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk\/resources\/commentaries\/uk-policies-to-deter-people-from-claiming-asylum\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/GV2S-YMFN].<\/p>\n

[31]<\/a> Alex Powell & Raawiyah Rifath, Sexual Diversity and the Nationality and Borders Act 2022<\/em>, 43 Legal Stud. 757, 760 (2023).<\/p>\n

[32]<\/a> Nationality and Borders Act 2022: the increased standard of proof for finding persecution and it\u2019s effect on LGBTQ Asylum Seekers, <\/em>Shawstone Assocs. Solics.; see NABA \u00a7 32(2).<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.shawstoneassociates.com\/nationality-and-borders-act-2022-the-increased-standard-of-proof-for-finding-persecution-and-its-effect-on-lgbtq-asylum-seekers\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/6MPP-LPSJ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2025).<\/p>\n

[33]<\/a>\u00a0 Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[34]<\/a> Nationality and Borders Act 2022, c. 36 (U.K.).<\/p>\n

[35]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[36]<\/a> Queer asylum seekers in the UK face danger and abuse – study, <\/em>Univ. of Birmingham (June 25, 2024), https:\/\/www.birmingham.ac.uk\/news\/2024\/queer-asylum-seekers-in-the-uk-system-face-danger-and-abuse-study# [https:\/\/perma.cc\/7X2A-KH8X].<\/p>\n

[37]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[38]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[39]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[40]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[41]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[42]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[43]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[44]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[45]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[46]<\/a> Zehrah Hasan, How the Nationality and Borders Act is Endangering Queer Asylum in Britain, <\/em>Open Democracy, (Jan. 15, 2025, 9:23 AM), https:\/\/www.opendemocracy.net\/en\/uk-nationality-borders-act-queer-lgbtiq-asylum-immigration\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/5WED-YMAB].<\/p>\n

[47]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[48]<\/a> Hasan, supra note 46.<\/p>\n

[49]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[50]<\/a> Morris, supra note 5.<\/p>\n

[51]<\/a> What We Do, <\/em>Rainbow Migration, https:\/\/www.rainbowmigration.org.uk\/what-we-do\/?_gl=1*zhjda6*_up*MQ..*_ga*MTMzNDM2MDQ2MS4xNzQxNzMwMzg3*_ga_BTGT3LYBB7*MTc0MTczMDM4Ni4xLjAuMTc0MTczMDM4Ni4wLjAuMA..*_ga_DXFQDC51ND*MTc0MTczMDM4Ny4xLjAuMTc0MTczMDM4Ny4wLjAuMA,<\/a> [https:\/\/perma.cc\/G4C7-L7AQ] (last visited Mar. 11, 2025).<\/p>\n

[52]<\/a> Assessment: U.S. Compliance with the Refugee Convention at Its 70th Anniversary<\/em>, Hum. Rts. First (July 27, 2021), https:\/\/humanrightsfirst.org\/library\/assessment-u-s-compliance-with-the-refugee-convention-at-its-70th-anniversary [https:\/\/perma.cc\/VE36-DQ55].<\/p>\n

[53]<\/a> Refugee Convention, supra<\/em> note 8, at art. 1.<\/p>\n

[54]<\/a> What is the 1951 Refugee Convention \u2013 and How Dies It Support Human Rights?<\/em>, Asylum Access (July 24, 2021), https:\/\/asylumaccess.org\/what-is-the-1951-refugee-convention-and-how-does-it-support-human-rights\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/6KHL-6MV4].<\/p>\n

[55]<\/a> Grace Kim, Abandoning the Subjective and Objective Components of a Well-Founded Fear of Persecution<\/em>, 16 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol\u2019y. 192, 193 (2021).<\/p>\n

[56]<\/a> Asylum Policy instruction: Sexual orientation in asylum claims, 14, (Home Off. 2016), https:\/\/assets.publishing.service.gov.uk\/media\/5a804b17ed915d74e622d9dc\/Sexual-orientation-in-asylum-claims-v6.pdf [https:\/\/perma.cc\/6VWY-BEGA].<\/p>\n

[57]<\/a> Lessons Not Learned: The Failure of Asylum Decision-Making in the U.K.,<\/em> Freedom From Torture (Sept. 2019), chrome-extension:\/\/efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj\/https:\/\/www.freedomfromtorture.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2019-09\/FFT_LessonsNotLearned_Report_A4_FINAL_LOWRES_1.pdf [https:\/\/perma.cc\/WSJ2-8NWN].<\/p>\n

[58]<\/a> HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Sec\u2019y of State for the Home Dep\u2019t, [2010] UKSC 31.<\/p>\n

[59]<\/a> 1.2<\/em> Determining Refugee Status Under UNHCR\u2019s Mandate, <\/em>UNHCR, https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/resettlement-handbook\/1-refugee-status-and-resettlement\/1-2-determining-refugee-status-under-unhcrs-mandate\/# [https:\/\/perma.cc\/HD95-B2B2] (last visited Feb. 22, 2025).<\/p>\n

[60]<\/a> UNHCR Updated Observations on the Nationality and Borders Act as Amended, <\/em>UNHCR (Jan. 2022), https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/uk\/media\/unhcr-updated-observations-nationality-and-borders-bill-amended [https:\/\/perma.cc\/L3KU-TCXJ].<\/p>\n

[61]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[62]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[63]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[64]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[65]<\/a> Hasan, supra note 46.<\/p>\n

[66]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[67]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[68]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[69]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[70]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[71]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[72]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[73]<\/a> UK\u2019s Sunak warns asylum seekers could \u2018overwhelm\u2019 parts of Europe, <\/em>Reuters (Dec. 16, 2023, 4:02 PM), https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/uks-sunak-warns-asylum-seekers-could-overwhelm-parts-europe-2023-12-16\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/W29V-F5ZV].<\/p>\n

[74]<\/a> Lizzie Dearden, Home Office says only half of UK asylum decisions meet its quality standards, <\/em>The Guardian (Dec. 8, 2024, 2:00 PM), https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/uk-news\/2024\/dec\/08\/home-office-says-only-half-of-uk-asylum-decisions-meet-its-quality-standards [https:\/\/perma.cc\/EZU2-JE7J].<\/p>\n

[75]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[76]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[77]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[78]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[79]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[80]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[81]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[82]<\/a> Rajeev Sval, Lack of legal aid lawyers poses threat to Starmer\u2019s asylum pledge, experts say, <\/em>The Guardian (Nov. 25, 2024, 5:00 PM), https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/law\/2024\/nov\/25\/legal-aid-lawyers-shortage-starmer-asylum-backlog-pledge [https:\/\/perma.cc\/TF6Z-P7X9].<\/p>\n

[83]<\/a> Colin Yeo, Briefing: Current Problems in the UK Asylum System and How to Address Them, <\/em>Free Movement, (Dec. 2024), https:\/\/freemovement.org.uk\/briefing-the-sorry-state-of-the-uk-asylum-system\/# [https:\/\/perma.cc\/HF6G-SPCZ].<\/p>\n

[84]<\/a> How Do Legal Aid Cuts Impact LGBTQ+ People Seeking Asylum?<\/em>, Rainbow Migration, https:\/\/www.rainbowmigration.org.uk\/publications\/how-do-legal-aid-cuts-impact-lgbtq-people-seeking-asylum\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/6QG5-SUHN] (last visited Feb. 22, 2025).<\/p>\n

[85]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[86]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[87]<\/a> Rainbow Migration, supra note 51.<\/p>\n

[88]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[89]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[90]<\/a> Ways to Support LGBTQ+ People Seeking Asylum, <\/em>Rainbow Migration, https:\/\/www.rainbowmigration.org.uk\/ways-to-support-lgbtqi-people-seeking-asylum\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/JMJ4-7JWK] (last visited Feb. 22, 2025).<\/p>\n

[91]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[92]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[93]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[94]<\/a> Hasan, supra note 46.<\/p>\n

[95]<\/a> UNCHR, supra note 59.<\/p>\n

[96]<\/a> Hasan, supra note 46.<\/p>\n

[97]<\/a> UNCHR, supra note 59.<\/p>\n

[98]<\/a> Sval, supra note 82.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Will Gronefeld, Associate Member, Immigration and Human Rights Law Review I. Introduction In 2023, sixty-four United Nations (U.N.) member states considered it a crime to be a member of the LGBTQI+ community.[1] Since 1951, international law has protected the rights of individuals within persecuted social groups to seek refuge.[2] The United Kingdom (U.K.) ranked fifth […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":65,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10,4,24],"tags":[25,294,295,45],"class_list":{"0":"post-580","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-human-rights","7":"category-immigration-law","8":"category-international-law","9":"tag-asylum","10":"tag-lgbtqi","11":"tag-nationality-and-borders-act","12":"tag-uk","13":"czr-hentry"},"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/580","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/65"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=580"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/580\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":583,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/580\/revisions\/583"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=580"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=580"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=580"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}