{"id":659,"date":"2025-11-12T12:35:59","date_gmt":"2025-11-12T17:35:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/?p=659"},"modified":"2025-11-12T12:37:15","modified_gmt":"2025-11-12T17:37:15","slug":"enforcing-the-unenforceable-international-human-rights-law-and-the-uyghur-crisis-in-xinjiang","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/2025\/11\/12\/enforcing-the-unenforceable-international-human-rights-law-and-the-uyghur-crisis-in-xinjiang\/","title":{"rendered":"Enforcing the Unenforceable: International Human Rights Law and the Uyghur Crisis in Xinjiang"},"content":{"rendered":"

Claire Roncallo, Associate Member, Immigration and Human Rights Law Review<\/em><\/p>\n

\"\"
“China: Muslims Repressed, Monitored, Forced into Camps” | Human Rights Watch (https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2019\/02\/14\/turkey-calls-out-chinas-repression-uyghurs)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

I. Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

Since 2014, the Chinese government has targeted the Uyghur population in Xinjiang through mass detention, forced assimilation, and cultural erasure.[1]<\/a> Human rights groups have condemned these actions as part of a broader effort to suppress the cultural and religious identity of the region\u2019s twelve million mostly Muslim Uyghurs.[2]<\/a> China\u2019s government has also allegedly orchestrated a mass migration of Han Chinese, China\u2019s ethnic majority, into Xinjiang in an attempt to dilute the Uyghur population.[3]<\/a> For over a decade, the Uyghur people have endured one of the most extensive state campaigns of repression in the modern era, defined by its sheer scale, its sophisticated use of artificial intelligence-driven surveillance, and the systemic effort to suppress religious and cultural identity.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n

This Blog examines the historical and political background of China\u2019s campaign against the Uyghur people in Xinjiang, including its use of mass detention, forced labor, and pervasive surveillance. It analyzes the legal allegations raised by international bodies\u2014violations of fundamental human rights such as freedom from torture, protection from arbitrary detention, and the rights to religion and cultural identity\u2014alongside China\u2019s responses. Finally, this Blog discusses potential legal reforms and accountability mechanisms that could help prevent similar abuses in the future.<\/p>\n

II. Background<\/strong><\/p>\n

Xinjiang, located in northwest China, is the country\u2019s only region with a majority Muslim population.[5]<\/a> The Uyghurs, who make up approximately forty-six percent of the region, are ethnically Turkic and have their own distinct language and culture.[6]<\/a> In May 2014, the Chinese government launched the \u201cStrike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism,\u201d a campaign targeting the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims by linking religious practice with extremism and terrorism.[7]<\/a> Since 2017, the Chinese government has significantly curtailed the Uyghurs\u2019 religious freedoms, imposing strict bans on long beards, headscarves, fasting during Ramadan, and religious gatherings outside state-approved mosques.[8]<\/a> These peaceful practices were redefined as signs of extremism, providing a pretext for the mass detention and re-education of Uyghurs in indoctrination camps across Xinjiang.[9]<\/a><\/p>\n

Since Xi Jinping\u2019s rise to power in 2013, the Chinese government has aggressively pursued assimilationist policies in ethnic minority regions, emphasizing \u201cSinicization\u201d of religion and culture.[10]<\/a> This policy reflects the increase in nationalism and Islamophobia and the government\u2019s view that the presence of the Uyghurs is a threat to national security.[11]<\/a> As Shohrat Zakir, then chairman of the Xinjiang regional government, declared in 2020, China had \u201ceffectively contained\u201d religious extremism and \u201claid a good foundation for completely solving the deeply rooted problems that affect the region\u2019s long-term stability,\u201d reflecting China\u2019s framing of the issue as one of counter-extremism rather than oppression.[12]<\/a><\/p>\n

Multiple human rights groups report that the Chinese government\u2019s actions against the Uyghur people constitute crimes against humanity.[13]<\/a> Uyghurs face arbitrary imprisonment, restrictions on religious practices, forced labor in cotton and textile industries, and population control measures, including forced sterilization of women.[14]<\/a> The Chinese government has imprisoned more than one million Uyghurs since 2017 and those who are not detained have been subjects of intense surveillance and other human rights violations.[15]<\/a> These acts implicate several fundamental human rights protected under international law, including freedom from torture and cruel treatment, protection against arbitrary detention, and rights to religion, cultural identity, and equality, as recognized in core human rights instruments such as the Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n

Further, economic incentives appear to contribute to this repression. Xinjiang produces about one-fifth of the world\u2019s cotton, making it a critical hub for textile exports and giving China strong economic invectives to maintain control over the region\u2019s workforce.[17]<\/a> International brands have sourced materials from factories in or near Xinjiang, which has made it difficult to separate ethical supply chains from those tainted by forced labor.[18]<\/a> To put it in perspective, this data means that 1 in 5 cotton garments in the global market are at risk of being tainted from the forced labor practices that the Uyghur people are subjected to.[19]<\/a> China tightly controls media coverage in Xinjiang and restricts access for foreign journalists and international observers, making independent verification difficult and limiting global awareness of the scope of these abuses.[20]<\/a><\/p>\n

Ultimately, China\u2019s campaign against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang constitutes a systemic assault on fundamental rights. Allegations of mass detention, forced labor, cultural erasure, and coercive birth control suggest violations of China\u2019s obligations under the Convention Against Torture, the Genocide Convention, and other core human rights treaties.[21]<\/a><\/p>\n

III. Discussion<\/strong><\/p>\n

A. China\u2019s Violations<\/u><\/p>\n

China\u2019s mass detention of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang implicates core protections under international law.[22]<\/a> The Convention Against Torture (CAT), which China ratified in 1988, prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.[23]<\/a> CAT makes clear that no exceptional circumstances justify torture.[24]<\/a> However, credible reports of physical abuse, sexual violence, and psychological coercion in so-called \u201cre-education centers\u201d fall squarely within CAT\u2019s prohibitions.[25]<\/a> These centers, officially referred to by the Chinese government as \u201cvocational training\u201d or \u201cpolitical education\u201d facilities, function as highly secure detention sites where Uyghur people are confined without trial and subjected to ideological indoctrination, forced Mandarin instruction, and surveillance, with the aim of eroding Uyghur cultural and religious identity and promoting assimilation into Han-centric national identity.[26]<\/a> According to Human Rights Watch, these facilities operate like prisons, enforcing strict discipline, constant monitoring, and punishment for expressing cultural or religious identity.[27]<\/a><\/p>\n

Beyond the prohibition of torture, China\u2019s arbitrary detention of Uyghurs also violates international protections against unlawful imprisonment. Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits arbitrary detention.[28]<\/a> Although China has not ratified the ICCPR, its signature binds it to refrain from acts that would defeat the treaty\u2019s purpose.[29]<\/a> The widespread imprisonment of Uyghurs without charge or due process constitutes such a breach.<\/p>\n

While these abuses alone constitute grave violations of international law, mounting evidence suggests an even more alarming dimension to China\u2019s campaign. China\u2019s treatment of the Uyghur people raises serious concerns under the Genocide Convention. Article II(d) defines genocide to include \u201cimposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.\u201d[30]<\/a> Researchers have documented that Chinese authorities disproportionately target Uyghur women with sterilization procedures and other coercive birth control measures, suggesting a deliberate policy of population suppression.[31]<\/a> National population growth in the largest Uyghur regions declined by 84% between 2015 and 2018, and one region set a near-zero birth rate target (1.05 per mile) for 2020, down from 19.66 per mile just two years before.[32]<\/a> In order for these acts to amount to genocide, proof of specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part is necessary, which is a high bar under international law.[33]<\/a> Traditionally, courts have required either explicit statements of intent or clear evidence that state actions are designed to bring about the physical or biological destruction of the group.[34]<\/a> International courts have emphasized that genocidal intent must be proven through \u201cfully conclusive\u201d evidence, often including documents expressly articulating the goal of destroying a protected group.[35]<\/a><\/p>\n

Despite this high bar, several countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands, have accused China of committing genocide.[36]<\/a> In doing so, these countries rely on a diverse body of evidence, including internal Chinese policies, statistical data on labor and births, and witness testimony.[37]<\/a> These findings underscore both the gravity of China\u2019s actions and the difficulty of enforcing genocide prohibitions against a powerful state.<\/p>\n

Beyond arbitrary detention and cultural repression, economic exploitation adds another layer to these abuses and further illustrates the gap between established human rights principles and the difficulty of enforcing them against powerful states. Forced labor in Xinjiang\u2019s cotton and textile industries represents yet another violation of international obligations.[38]<\/a> Reports indicate that Uyghurs are compelled to work under coercive conditions in cotton fields, spinning mills, and garment factories.[39]<\/a> Many are transferred directly from \u201cre-education centers\u201d into factory jobs under state-mandated labor programs; refusal to participate can lead to renewed detention or punishment.[40]<\/a> Article 8 of the ICCPR prohibits slavery and servitude, while the International Labor Organization\u2019s Forced Labor Conventions (No. 29 and No. 105), both ratified by China, explicitly ban compulsory labor.[41]<\/a> In response to these abuses, the United States enacted the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which prohibits the import of goods produced through forced labor in Xinjiang.[42]<\/a> This measure demonstrates how trade and economic leverage can serve as indirect mechanisms to enforce compliance with international human rights norms when direct accountability is unavailable.[43]<\/a><\/p>\n

Beyond forced labor, China\u2019s extensive surveillance system in Xinjiang presents further violations.[44]<\/a> Authorities have deployed facial recognition cameras, biometric data collection, and phone-tracking technologies to continuously monitor Uyghur communities.[45]<\/a> Human Rights Watch reports that Xinjiang\u2019s surveillance uses algorithms to flag Uyghurs for questioning or detention based on ordinary activities, such as attending religious services, using certain phone apps, or communicating with family members abroad.[46]<\/a> Such surveillance practices violate rights to privacy, freedom of movement, and freedom of religion guaranteed under instruments such as the ICCPR and CERD.[47]<\/a><\/p>\n

Finally, China\u2019s campaign to erase Uyghur cultural and religious identity directly contravenes its obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which China ratified in 1981.[48]<\/a> CERD requires states to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination and guarantee equality in the enjoyment of civil, political, and cultural rights.[49]<\/a> The destruction of mosques, suppression of Uyghur language, and prohibition of religious practices all constitute clear violations of China\u2019s obligations under CERD.[50]<\/a><\/p>\n

Taken together, these abuses reveal the gap between international law in principle and enforcement in practice. Although established treaties prohibit torture, forced labor, and genocide, the international community still lacks effective mechanisms to hold powerful states like China accountable.<\/p>\n

B. Possible Remedies<\/u><\/p>\n

Holding China accountable for the abuses occurring in Xinjiang presents legal and political challenges. China is not a party to the International Criminal Court (ICC), meaning the ICC cannot independently investigate or prosecute Chinese officials for genocide, torture, or other crimes against humanity unless the UN Security Council refers the situation.[51]<\/a> [52]<\/a> However, because China holds veto power on the Council, such a referral is highly unlikely.[53]<\/a><\/p>\n

Despite these barriers, several alternative mechanisms can still promote accountability. One option is universal jurisdiction, which allows national courts to prosecute individuals for grave international crimes\u2014such as torture or crimes against humanity\u2014regardless of where those crimes occurred.[54]<\/a> For example, Germany successfully prosecuted Syrian officials under universal jurisdiction, and a similar approach could apply if Chinese officials responsible for the abuses in Xinjiang were to travel abroad.[55]<\/a> If such officials entered a country that recognizes universal jurisdiction, prosecutors could open investigations or issue arrest warrants based on evidence of international crimes gathered by non-governmental organizations, survivor testimony, or UN reports.[56]<\/a> Although difficult in reality, these cases can serve as powerful symbols of international condemnation and create tangible legal risks for perpetrators.<\/p>\n

The most effective tools to date have been trade and economic measures.[57]<\/a> As mentioned earlier, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act in the United States bans products tied to forced labor in Xinjiang from entering U.S. markets.[58]<\/a> While these measures do not directly punish the Chinese government, they restrict the ability of corporations to profit from forced labor.[59]<\/a> Other states are following suit: the European Union is developing regulations to ban all goods produced through forced labor from its markets.[60]<\/a><\/p>\n

Human Rights Watch has proposed additional remedies to strengthen accountability. These include establishing a U.N. commission of inquiry to investigate abuses, identify responsible officials, and propose reparations for victims.[61]<\/a> Governments are also urged to coordinate the use of targeted sanctions, such as travel bans and asset freezes, to pressure those responsible.[62]<\/a> Further, strengthening corporate accountability could reduce complicity in forced labor, for example through mandatory human rights due diligence and supply-chain transparency laws requiring companies to investigate and address forced-labor risks.[63]<\/a> States also have a humanitarian duty to protect those fleeing persecution in Xinjiang by ensuring fair asylum procedures and preventing the forced return of refugees to China.[64]<\/a><\/p>\n

Taken together, these possible strategies suggest a multi-faceted approach to accountability; one that combines legal enforcement, economic leverage, and humanitarian protection to fulfill the international community\u2019s obligation to defend a population facing repression.<\/p>\n

IV. Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

The mass detention, forced labor, and cultural repression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang expose the weaknesses of the international legal system. While international law clearly prohibits genocide, torture, and forced labor, enforcing these norms against powerful states like China remains a major challenge due to political influence and the limited reach of existing enforcement mechanisms. Expanding universal jurisdiction, strengthening human rights monitoring, and leveraging trade laws and economic pressure may represent the most realistic paths forward to hold China accountable and deter future violations. If the international community fails to respond to the systematic persecution of the Uyghurs, it risks signaling that power, not principle, governs the scope of human rights protections in the twenty-first century.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Lindsay Maizland, China\u2019s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,<\/em> Council on Foreign Rel. (Oct. 3, 2025), https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights [https:\/\/perma.cc\/C4YL-LLNH].<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Who are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide?,<\/em> BBC News (Sep. 23, 2021), https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-asia-china-22278037 [https:\/\/perma.cc\/A3ED-5K8A] [hereinafter Who are the Uyghurs<\/em>].<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> \u201cBreak Their Lineage, Break Their Roots\u201d: China\u2019s Crimes against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims<\/em>, Hum. Rts. Watch (Apr. 19, 2021), https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/report\/2021\/04\/19\/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots\/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting [https:\/\/perma.cc\/VP6G-XUES] [hereinafter Break Their Lineage<\/em>].<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Norwegian Uyghur Committee, Uyghur Human Rights Project & World Uyghur Congress, Submission to the United Nations General Assembly on Eliminating Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief and the Achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16), <\/em>2 (June 1, 2020), https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/Documents\/Issues\/Religion\/Submissions\/CSOs\/53.nuc-uhrp-wuc.pdf [https:\/\/perma.cc\/9536-RXMJ].<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Break Their Lineage<\/em>, supra<\/em> note 5.<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Adrian Zense, Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: The CCP\u2019s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang, <\/em>The Jamestown Foundation 1, 2 (June 2020), https:\/\/jamestown.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-REVISED-March-17-2021.pdf [https:\/\/perma.cc\/8WGF-3XMX]; Who are the Uyghurs, supra<\/em> note 2.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> Maizland, supra<\/em> note 1.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> G.A. Res. 39\/46, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A\/RES\/39\/46 (Dec. 10, 1984); G.A. Res. 260 A (III), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. A\/RES\/260 A (Dec. 9, 1948); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A\/RES\/2200A (Dec. 16, 1966).<\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> Who are the Uyghurs, supra<\/em> note 2.<\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[20]<\/a> China\u2019s Weak Excuse to Block Investigations in Xinjiang, <\/em>Hum. Rts. Watch (Mar. 25, 2020), https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2020\/03\/25\/chinas-weak-excuse-block-investigations-xinjiang [https:\/\/perma.cc\/36PS-AGCC].<\/p>\n

[21]<\/a> G.A. Res. 39\/46; G.A. Res. 260 A (III); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra <\/em>note 16.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[23]<\/a> G.A. Res. 39\/46, supra <\/em>note 16.<\/p>\n

[24]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[25]<\/a> Break Their Lineage, supra<\/em> note 5.<\/p>\n

[26]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[27]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[28]<\/a> Bret I. Parker, Letter to Chinese State Leadership Regarding Human Rights Violations Against Muslim and Turkic Peoples in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, <\/em>N.Y.C. Bar Ass\u2019n (Aug. 28, 2020), https:\/\/www.nycbar.org\/reports\/letter-to-chinese-state-leadership-regarding-human-rights-violations-against-muslim-and-turkic-peoples-in-the-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/TM58-Q6WR].<\/p>\n

[29]<\/a> Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uyghur in Xinjiang, <\/em>Hum. Rts. Watch (Apr. 11, 2005), https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/report\/2005\/04\/11\/devastating-blows\/religious-repression-uighurs-xinjiang [https:\/\/perma.cc\/UK7U-LUAH].<\/p>\n

[30]<\/a> G.A. Res. 260 A (III), supra<\/em> note 16.<\/p>\n

[31]<\/a> Zense, supra<\/em> note 14.<\/p>\n

[32]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[33]<\/a> \u00a0Definitions of Genocide and Related Crimes, <\/em>U.N. Off. on Genocide Prevention and the Resp. to Protect, https:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/genocide-prevention\/definition [https:\/\/perma.cc\/VQ25-BYY3] (last visited Nov. 5, 2025).<\/p>\n

[34]<\/a> Julian Borger, Question of intent makes genocide hardest crime to prove, <\/em>The Guardian (Dec. 19, 2024), https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/law\/2024\/dec\/19\/question-of-intent-makes-genocide-hardest-to-prove [https:\/\/perma.cc\/RW66-47B7].<\/p>\n

[35]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[36]<\/a> Who are the Uyghurs, supra<\/em> note 2.<\/p>\n

[37]<\/a> Dr. Azeem Ibrahim, The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China\u2019s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention, <\/em>New Lines Inst. for Strategy and Pol\u2019y 1, 10 (Mar. 2021), https:\/\/newlinesinstitute.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf [https:\/\/perma.cc\/4G49-85FT].<\/p>\n

[38]<\/a> Who are the Uyghurs, supra<\/em> note 2.<\/p>\n

[39]<\/a> Break Their Lineage, supra <\/em>note 5.<\/p>\n

[40]<\/a> Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, Dr. James Leibold et al., Uyghurs for sale, <\/em>Austrian Strategic Pol\u2019y Inst. (Mar. 1, 2020), https:\/\/www.aspi.org.au\/report\/uyghurs-sale\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/F6AD-B3Y6].<\/p>\n

[41]<\/a> International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 8, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. Treaty Doc. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Int\u2019l Labour Org., Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) <\/em>(June 28, 1930), https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/instruments-mechanisms\/instruments\/forced-labour-convention-1930-no-29 [https:\/\/perma.cc\/H9CE-WLKZ].<\/p>\n

[42]<\/a> Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, H.R.\u202f1155, 117th\u202fCong. (2021) (enacted Dec.\u202f23,\u202f2021).<\/p>\n

[43]<\/a> Dr. Sofia Gonzalez De Aguinaga, Forced Labour Import Bans in 2025: A Global Review of Policies and Enforcement, <\/em>Mod. Slavery Pol\u2019y & Evidence Ctr. (Feb. 2025), https:\/\/www.modernslaverypec.org\/resources\/forced-labour-import-bans-2025 [https:\/\/perma.cc\/C6XF-WVPU].<\/p>\n

[44]<\/a> Maya Wang, China\u2019s Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App, <\/em>Hum. Rts. Watch (May 1, 2019), https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/report\/2019\/05\/01\/chinas-algorithms-repression\/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass [https:\/\/perma.cc\/TR5E-AZ4H].<\/p>\n

[45]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[46]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[47]<\/a>ICCPR, supra<\/em> note 41; General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, <\/em>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A\/RES\/2106 (Feb. 21, 1965) [hereinafter ICERD].<\/p>\n

[48]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[49]<\/a> ICERD, supra<\/em> note 47.<\/p>\n

[50]<\/a> Break Their Lineage, supra<\/em> note 5.<\/p>\n

[51]<\/a> How the Court works, <\/em>Int\u2019l Crim. Ct., https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/about\/how-the-court-works [https:\/\/perma.cc\/VH4B-FQX4] (last visited Nov. 5, 2025); Fact sheet: China and the International Criminal Court<\/em>, Amnesty Int\u2019l, 2 (July 2007), https:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/ar\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/07\/asa170232007en.pdf [https:\/\/perma.cc\/7EWL-8XCJ].<\/p>\n

[52]<\/a> The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a permanent tribunal established in 2002 under the Rome Statute <\/em>to prosecute individuals for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression. The court is intended to complement, not to replace, national criminal systems and therefore only prosecutes cases when States are unwilling or unable to do so. How the Court Works, supra<\/em> note 51.<\/p>\n

[53]<\/a> Break Their Lineage, supra<\/em> note 5.<\/p>\n

[54]<\/a> Universal Jurisdiction, <\/em>Ctr. for Glob. Just., Ne. Univ. Sch. of L., https:\/\/cglj.org\/human-rights-oversight\/national-systems\/domestic-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/ADJ8-2X5A] (last visited Nov. 5, 2025).<\/p>\n

[55]<\/a> Madeline Chambers, German police arrest Syrian man suspected of crimes against humanity, <\/em>Reuters (Sep. 30, 2025), https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/middle-east\/german-police-arrest-syrian-man-suspected-crimes-against-humanity-2025-09-30\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/YE4V-BH2W].<\/p>\n

[56]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[57]<\/a> Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, supra<\/em> note 42.<\/p>\n

[58]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[59]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[60]<\/a> European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Prohibiting Products Made with Forced Labour on the Union Market, EUR-Lex (Sep. 14, 2022), https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX%3A52022PC0453 [https:\/\/perma.cc\/B85L-WRNN].<\/p>\n

[61]<\/a> Break Their Lineage, supra<\/em> note 5, at 49.<\/p>\n

[62]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n

[63]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 51.<\/p>\n

[64]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 52.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Claire Roncallo, Associate Member, Immigration and Human Rights Law Review I. Introduction Since 2014, the Chinese government has targeted the Uyghur population in Xinjiang through mass detention, forced assimilation, and cultural erasure.[1] Human rights groups have condemned these actions as part of a broader effort to suppress the cultural and religious identity of the region\u2019s […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":68,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10,24],"tags":[160,228,84,39,248,272,249,328,327],"class_list":{"0":"post-659","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-human-rights","7":"category-international-law","8":"tag-china","9":"tag-convention-against-torture","10":"tag-detention","11":"tag-human-rights","12":"tag-human-rights-violations","13":"tag-iccpr","14":"tag-international-law","15":"tag-persecution","16":"tag-religion","17":"czr-hentry"},"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/659","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/68"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=659"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/659\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":662,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/659\/revisions\/662"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=659"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=659"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawblogs.uc.edu\/ihrlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=659"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}