Cameron McDonald, Associate Member, Immigration and Human Rights Law Review
I. Introduction
In July 2025, thousands gathered at MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford, New Jersey, for the Club World Cup final.[1] Before kickoff, a father attending the game with his 10- and 14-year-old children briefly used a small drone outside the stadium to take a photograph.[2] Police officers questioned him for violating a local ordinance prohibiting drone use and, after asking about his immigration status, transferred him to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).[3] Because the father was an asylum seeker with a pending claim, ICE detained him for three months. As he was taken away that day, his children were left crying in the parking lot.[4]
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) recognizes that individuals fleeing conflict and persecution are entitled to protection.[5] The United States has long endorsed this principle, incorporating protections for asylum seekers into domestic law while remaining UNHCR’s largest financial contributor.[6] Yet, despite these commitments, asylum seekers with pending claims are increasingly subjected to prolonged detention under ICE authority.[7] Although detention authority and immigration court adjudication are distinct components of the immigration system, they operate in tandem. Expanded detention increases pressure on asylum seekers, while institutional constraints within immigration courts limit meaningful review of that detention.
This Blog explores how ICE’s detention of asylum seekers with pending claims—without sufficient procedural protections—raises serious constitutional and statutory concerns under the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Part II outlines the asylum process in the United States and the legal limits on ICE’s detention authority. Part III analyzes how expanded detention practices, combined with institutional pressures within immigration courts, weaken the procedural protections intended to safeguard asylum seekers. Finally, Part IV concludes by considering the implications of these developments for due process and access to justice.
II. Background
The incident at MetLife Stadium reflects a broader pattern of expanding immigration detention.[8] Since the start of President Trump’s second term in office, ICE’s total detentions have increased by nearly 75 percent, reaching 70,805 detainees as of December 2025, the highest level ever recorded.[9] Additionally, noncriminal detentions alone have increased by 2,450 percent during this same period.[10] ICE continues to detain asylum seekers, often without explanation, even months after immigration judges have granted them humanitarian protections.[11] These trends raise serious questions about the scope of ICE’s detention authority and the procedural safeguards available to asylum seekers with pending claims.[12]
ICE’s increasing emphasis on detention and deportation, rather than on the meaningful access to justice and fair adjudication, has far-reaching consequences for constitutional due process and fundamental human rights.[13] Understanding these consequences requires an overview of the U.S. asylum process, the scope and limits of ICE’s detention authority, and the constitutional and statutory protections that govern immigration court proceedings.
A. Seeking Asylum in the United States
Asylum seekers are individuals requesting refugee protection to escape violence or threats in their country of origin.[14] The asylum process is administered across multiple agencies, including the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), and ICE.[15] USCIS, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), adjudicates initial asylum applications and administers the legal immigration system outside of immigration court.[16] EOIR, housed within the Department of Justice (”DOJ“), oversees the immigration court system and employs immigration judges responsible for interpreting and applying immigration law in asylum proceedings.[17] ICE, also part of DHS, functions as the enforcement agency authorized to detain asylum seekers while their immigration claims remain pending.[18]
To apply for asylum, an individual must first be physically present in the United States.[19] Within one year of arrival, asylum seekers must file a Form-I-589 with USCIS, complete a background check, and participate in an asylum interview.[20] Although the USCIS website states that most cases receive a decision within two weeks after the interview, asylum seekers typically wait more than six years to receive a final resolution of their claims.[21]
The Trump administration has sought to accelerate this process by expanding detention and deportation efforts, framing these measures as necessary to “protect national security and public safety.”[22] As of early 2026, more than one million asylum cases remain pending, contributing to a backlog of over 3.2 million total immigration cases nationwide, while the United States employs only approximately 600 immigration judges.[23] In response, the DOJ has proposed increasing judicial capacity by appointing temporary military attorneys as immigration judges, individuals who receive significantly less immigration-specific training than career judges.[24] This disparity between judicial capacity and case volume has led to DOJ officials requiring immigration court judges to hear six cases per day, double the average docket compared to the Biden administration.[25]
The resulting pressure to resolve cases has created strong institutional incentives to deny asylum in most cases, allowing ICE agents to detain asylum seekers immediately following case dismissal, often within courthouse hallways.[26] Once asylum is denied, an asylum seeker no longer has the protected status to remain in the United States legally.[27] Immediately detaining the previously-protected asylum seeker is a deliberate enforcement strategy to facilitate rapid deportation if all appeals fail and a final removal order is issued.[28]
B. Scope and Limits of ICE Detention Authority
ICE asserts that it operates under strict detention standards and maintains a non-punitive detention policy.[29] ICE claims to focus on humanitarian considerations for civil detentions, including access to basic living conditions and medical services.[30] However, in practice, detainees, including asylum seekers, have reported “punishing conditions, enforced isolation, neglect of people with disabilities, denial of access to counsel, and… inadequate medical care.”[31] ICE has also failed to keep track of individuals whom they detain, rendering family members and legal representatives unable to find the detainees, sometimes until after deportation.[32] ICE may legally detain asylum seekers immediately upon their entry into the United States.[33] As a result, ICE officers exercise near-exclusive authority to release asylum seekers from detention, whether through parole or bond determinations.[34]
The INA grants ICE statutory authority to arrest and detain asylum seekers throughout the United States upon meeting the low threshold of reasonable suspicion.[35] Reasonable suspicion is the lowest standard of legal justification for law enforcement, only requiring the articulable fact that a crime may occur.[36] During the first year of President Trump’s second term, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act increased ICE’s funding to its highest level on record.[37] As a result, ICE’s detention capacity has expanded significantly, including through the increased use of detention contracts with for-profit private companies to confine asylum seekers with pending claims at ICE’s discretion.[38] However, this expansive enforcement authority exists alongside humanitarian protections designed to safeguard asylum seekers.[39]
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) brought the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees into force in 1967.[40] The United States became a party upon signing, binding itself to this international treaty.[41] The Protocol’s principles were later incorporated into U.S. law through the Refugee Act of 1980.[42] The Refugee Act aligns humanitarian protection with immigration enforcement by ensuring that asylum seekers are afforded due process and meaningful access to asylum in the United States.[43] These international obligations operate alongside constitutional and statutory guarantees to further protect asylum seekers with pending claims within the United States.
C. Constitutional and Statutory Guarantees
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including citizens and noncitizens alike.[44] Individuals with pending immigration statuses are therefore entitled to a fair opportunity to have their cases heard, as well as protection against arbitrary deprivation of liberty.[45] Procedural due process generally requires individualized, case-by-case determinations, reasonable limits on detention where authorized by law, access to notice, a meaningful hearing, and a neutral decisionmaker.[46]
The INA works in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment, so immigration judges must apply immigration statutes in a manner that aligns with constitutional due process protections.[47] The INA provides both substantive eligibility standards and procedural mechanisms that immigration courts apply.[48] However, the DOJ has recently targeted immigration court judges, firing those with immigrant defense backgrounds–around 100 out of the original 700 immigration court judges who served at the start of this administration.[49] At the same time, the DOJ has begun a new hiring campaign focused on hiring “deportation” judges.[50] This intentional phrasing insinuates that ICE values efficiency and removal above all.[51] As ICE intensifies its removal processes across the United States, the practice of detaining asylum seekers with pending claims has emerged as the main strategy to accelerate deportation—raising urgent human rights questions in the process.
III. Discussion
ICE detention practices increasingly prioritize prolonged confinement in service of expedited deportations, often at the expense of due process protections afforded to asylum seekers.[52] These practices raise serious human rights concerns because the Constitution’s guarantee of due process protects fundamental rights to liberty, access to counsel, fair adjudication, and protection from arbitrary detention. When asylum seekers with pending claims are detained without meaningful access to these protections, their deprivation extends beyond statutory and constitutional violations and implicates internationally recognized human rights norms governing the treatment of asylum seekers. This section analyzes how ICE’s detention of asylum seekers with pending claims violates constitutional protections and exceeds the INA’s statutory limits, examining how the lack of due process safeguards, departures from established detention authority, and institutional unwillingness to combat ICE’s practices all contribute to serious human rights concerns.
A. Constitutional and Statutory Violations
Recent executive policies have introduced additional procedural and financial barriers that make access to asylum increasingly difficult.[53] USCIS now requires asylum seekers, who are fleeing violence and poverty, to pay an annual fee of $102.[54] In addition to this financial burden, expedited adjudication policies increasingly result in case dismissals before asylum seekers receive full evidentiary hearings.[55]
Prolonged detention without individualized review places significant pressure on asylum seekers with pending claims, increasing the likelihood that some will abandon their claims and accept deportation rather than continue navigating a restrictive detention system.[56] Prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings raises serious constitutional concerns under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In Garland v. Gonzales, however, the Supreme Court held that certain detained citizens are not statutorily entitled to bond hearings, thereby permitting extended detention with mandatory individualized review.[57] In dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor warned that the decision “risks depriving many vulnerable noncitizens of any meaningful opportunity to protect their rights.”[58] Concerns about meaningful access to due process are further exacerbated by institutional pressures within immigration courts that prioritize finishing cases over careful adjudication.[59]
The Trump administration has emphasized the size and slowness of the immigration court backlog.[60] To increase courtroom efficiency, the administration recommends denying pending asylum applications that have minor inconsistencies or incomplete documentation.[61] Not only is this approach ineffective in practice, but it also violates both due process and the requirements standardized under the INA because it strips asylum seekers of the rights to which they are entitled under the Constitution.[62] When asylum claims are denied without robust procedural safeguards, applicants may be returned to detention or placed into removal proceedings with limited opportunity for meaningful review.[63] Moreover, denying asylum slows down the legal process: prosecutors have become overwhelmed by habeas petitions from migrants challenging their detention.[64]
In addition to hindering the legal process, the expansion of ICE’s detention practices raises serious concerns about statutory overreach under the INA.[65] By expanding detention beyond the limited circumstances expressly written in the INA, ICE risks transforming the immigration system’s discretionary civil custody framework into a system of mandatory detention.[66] As temporary military judges replace fired immigration judges, the risk of doctrinal inconsistency and uneven application of precedent increases.[67] This transition also creates the possibility that newly appointed judges will interpret existing precedent more narrowly, potentially reshaping asylum jurisprudence in ways that favor removal.[68] Immigration court judges face a coercive choice: set new precedent or lose their job.[69] By instructing judges both to deny asylum in most cases and ignore applications with slight discrepancies, the administration disregards the INA’s procedural process and the constitutional requirement of a neutral decisionmaker.[70]
When ICE deportation officers exercise broad authority over release decisions, meaningful external review becomes limited, concentrating power within the enforcement agency itself.[71] This concentration of unchecked, broad authority reveals a deeper human rights crisis: when constitutional and statutory guarantees exist only in theory, the legal process itself becomes inaccessible to the very people it is meant to protect.[72] To understand why these violations in the immigration system arise so frequently, it is necessary to confront the structural and institutional challenges that disrupt the enforcement of constitutional, statutory, and human rights standards.
B. Challenges in Enforcing Constitutional and Statutory Standards
The enforcement of constitutional and statutory standards in the 2026 immigration landscape is obstructed by significant justifiability issues and increased executive deference, which prioritize administrative efficiency over fundamental human rights.[73] While the Fifth Amendment protects against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, judicial and legislative oversight has not consistently imposed meaningful limits on ICE’s detention practices.[74] This failure to check ICE’s power is exacerbated by the fact that ICE has acted with broad authority to release asylum seekers from detention, functionally insulating these life-altering decisions from reaching meaningful judicial review.[75] Accordingly, immigration courts often defer to the executive branch’s rationale of “national security and public safety,” sometimes at the expense of individualized, case-by-case determinations central to procedural due process.[76]
Practical barriers, including limited access to counsel and accelerated adjudication timelines, further weaken human rights protections.[77] Requiring immigration judges to resolve as many as six cases per day intensifies institutional pressure to prioritize speed over thorough adjudication, straining compliance with constitutional, statutory, and humanitarian commitments reflected in the Refugee Act of 1980.[78]
Extreme political pressure has compromised the independence of immigration courts, as the DOJ has fired, as previously stated, one out of every seven immigration judges—specifically those with backgrounds in immigrant defense.[79] The pressure to act as a “deportation” judge—denying most asylum cases to avoid termination—rather than be a true “immigration” judge who fairly adjudicates, undermines the EOIR and completely disregards a neutral application of the law.[80] These challenges, therefore, result in perpetuated abuse at the hands of ICE and the immigration system ICE enforces.[81] Because current enforcement practices prioritize efficiency and removal, the next section proposes reforms aimed at restoring judicial independence and realigning immigration enforcement with constitutional and humanitarian obligations.
C. Recommendations and Future Considerations
To establish clearer limits on ICE’s authority to detain asylum seekers, meaningful judicial and legislative reform is required.[82] ICE currently operates under a “reasonable suspicion” standard that permits arrests in a wide range of locations, including courthouses.[83] Courts should clarify enforceable limits on who ICE may detain, under what circumstances, and for what duration.[84] Prolonged detentions of asylum seekers, specifically those without criminal histories who have followed the legal process, raises serious concerns under constitutional due process principles and humanitarian protections recognized by the United States.[85] Furthermore, immigration courts and oversight bodies should ensure access to counsel, adequate medical care, sanitary detention conditions, and the ability for all asylum seekers to attend their hearings.[86]
While the DOJ’s goal of improving efficiency within immigration courts is understandable, increasing caseloads for inadequately trained judges and encouraging rigid adjudication standards is not a sustainable solution.[87] Meaningful reformations to ICE’s detention practices are necessary to ensure compliance with the Constitution, the INA, and the humanitarian commitments reflected in the Refugee Act of 1980.[88] ICE should adopt transparent oversight mechanisms to provide accountability for its detention and enforcement practices.[89] Establishing these checks—whether it be independent medical or legal observers—would ensure that detention practices do not prioritize efficiency over due process and fundamental human rights.[90] Guidance from international institutions such as the UNHCR and the OHCHR provides a useful framework for restoring detention conditions and safeguarding the rights of asylum seekers.[91] By shifting away from enforcement models that emphasize removal as a primary objective and recommitting to meaningful access to justice, the government can better safeguard fair adjudication and the protections of human rights.[92]
IV. Conclusion
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees that persons within the United States, citizens and noncitizens alike, are entitled to a fair opportunity to be heard.[93] This constitutional mandate, alongside the INA and Refugee Act of 1980, establishes a legal framework to protect the rights of all asylum seekers.[94] Therefore, ICE’s enforcement practices must remain consistent with constitutional and statutory protections applicable to all persons.[95] The immigration system must return to individualized, case-by-case determinations made by trained and impartial adjudicators and ensure that asylum seekers have meaningful access to a fair hearing.[96] The stakes are significant: the normalization of prolonged detention and expedited removal risks eroding the integrity of the U.S. immigration system and the rule of law more broadly.[97]
With noncriminal detentions surging and ICE funding reaching record levels, while increasing reliance on for-profit detention centers, the United States faces growing scrutiny over whether its enforcement practices remain consistent with its professed commitment to liberty and due process.[98] If this pattern persists, repairing both institutional trust and the harms experienced by detained asylum seekers will require sustained reform. Meaningful change is therefore urgent—not only to protect individual rights, but to preserve the legitimacy of the immigration system itself.[99]
[1] US: ICE Arrest at FIFA Event Spotlights Dangers for World Cup, Hum. Rts. Watch (Dec. 3, 2025), https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/12/03/us-ice-arrest-at-fifa-event-spotlights-dangers-for-world-cup [https://perma.cc/43FN-YZD3] [hereinafter ICE Arrest at FIFA Event].
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Asylum-seekers, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/us/about-unhcr/who-we-protect/asylum-seekers [https://perma.cc/W353-PE3N] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026) [hereinafter UNHCR].
[6] The United States of America’s support for UNHCR, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/planning-funding-and-results/donors/united-states-america?dataset=CNT&yearsMode=single&selectedYears=%5B2025%5D&level=DNR&category=EMK&fundingSource=SOF&compareBy=%5B%22fundingSource%22%2C%22category%22%5D&levelCompare=%5B%5B%22US%22%5D%5D&viewType=chart&chartType=bar&tableDataView=absolute [https://perma.cc/H6DM-F42E] (last visited Feb. 4, 2026).
[7] Court Orders ICE To Stop Unlawful Arrest and Detention of Refugees, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project (Jan. 28, 2026), https://refugeerights.org/news-resources/court-orders-ice-to-stop-unlawful-arrest-and-detention-of-refugees [https://perma.cc/HHD5-FA35]; Rashawn Ray & Gabriel R. Sanchez, ICE expansion has outpaced accountability. What are the remedies?, Brookings (Jan. 26, 2025), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ice-expansion-has-outpaced-accountability-what-are-the-remedies/ [https://perma.cc/L88D-EY5R].
[8] ICE Arrest at FIFA Event, supra note 1.
[9] How many people are being detained by ICE? USAFacts, https://usafacts.org/answers/how-many-people-are-being-detained-by-ice/country/united-states/ [https://perma.cc/5H65-LNVS] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026) [hereinafter USAFacts].
[10] Report: Immigration Detention Is Bigger, Harsher, and Less Accountable than Ever, Am. Immigr. Council (Jan. 14, 2026), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/press-release/report-trump-immigration-detention-2026/#:~:text=%E2%80%9COver%20the%20next%20three%20years,to%2041%20percent%20by%20December [https://perma.cc/GD6A-EQ4E] [hereinafter Immigration Detention is Bigger].
[11] Id.
[12] Rachel Spacek, Most WA federal rulings found immigrant detentions flouted due process, InvestigateWest (Feb. 10, 2026), https://www.investigatewest.org/rulings-found-immigrant-detentions-flouted-due-process/ [https://perma.cc/BP6X-TWT9]; Detention Under INA §235(b): The Statutory Scheme and Strategies for Release, Am. Immigr. Council & Legal Soc’y (Sept. 2025), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Practice_Advisory_Detention_Under_INA235.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5PE-MWJM].
[13] Heidi Altman, ICE is detaining indiscriminately. And releasing almost no one., Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr. (Oct. 21, 2025), https://www.nilc.org/articles/ice-is-detaining-indiscriminately-and-releasing-almost-no-one/ [https://perma.cc/K89W-823H].
[14] UNHCR, supra note 5.
[15] DHS, USCIS, ICE, CBP, EOIR, BIA, and DOS – Who are these people?, Graham Prichard Immigr. L., https://prichardlawfirm.com/other-2/who-is-immigration#:~:text=The%20Executive%20Office%20for%20Immigration,interpreting%20and%20applying%20immigration%20laws [https://perma.cc/V4GM-K8YH] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026).
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Serv., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/the-affirmative-asylum-process [https://perma.cc/8TQW-FALD] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026).
[20] Form-I-589 is a twelve-page application that requires listing personal and familial information, government documentation, current residence, and short answer responses on the asylum seeker’s criminal history and rationale for applying for asylum. The interview is non-adversarial, lasts at least one hour, and requires an oath to tell the truth while the asylum seeker pleads their case for asylum. Id.
[21] Id.; Summer Scovil, Explainer: Asylum Backlogs, Forum Pol’y (Jan. 23, 2024), https://forumtogether.org/article/explainer-asylum-backlogs/ [https://perma.cc/2SKE-KBRF].
[22] Celine Castronuovo, Trump Immigration Judges Pushed to Deny Asylum in Swift Training, Bloomberg Law (Feb. 4, 2026), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/exp/eyJpZCI6IjAwMDAwMTljLTBhZGQtZDYwOS1hZGZjLTllZmYxNDE2MDAwMCIsImN0eHQiOiJMV05XIiwidXVpZCI6IjlwdmxiZFIxNXVGQ05PYXc5U21XN0E9PUNlOVZUVkRnNEdQd05WRVBuWVpyRHc9PSIsInRpbWUiOiIxNzcwMjA2NzA4ODgwIiwic2lnIjoiWXN3ZmMwajg5LzFFbjBRYzY2TXRzblZ1UXc0PSIsInYiOiIxIn0=?source=newsletter&item=body-link®ion=text-section&channel=us-law-week&emailQueueID=%24%24EmailQueueID%24%24&senderID=%24%24SenderID%24%24 [https://perma.cc/W4F6-5YH5].
[23] USCIS Faces Challenges Meeting Statutory Timelines and Reducing Its Backlog of Affirmative Asylum Claims, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Off. of Inspector Gen. (July 3, 2024), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2024-07/OIG-24-36-Jul24.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AB5-ZN7H].
[24] Castronuovo, supra note 22.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.; Unlawful ICE Arrests at Immigration Courthouses Prompt Lawsuit by Advocates and Immigrants, Nat’l Immigr. Just. Ctr. (Jul. 16, 2025), https://immigrantjustice.org/press-release/unlawful-ice-arrests-at-immigration-courthouses-prompt-lawsuit-by-advocates-and-immigrants/#:~:text=Patrol%20more%20funding.-,Unlawful%20ICE%20Arrests%20at%20Immigration%20Courthouses%20Prompt%20Lawsuit%20by%20Advocates,were%20waiting%20at%20the%20courthouse [https://perma.cc/W668-9EH6] [hereinafter Unlawful ICE Arrests].
[27] Id.
[28] Id.
[29] Detention Management, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management#:~:text=ICE%20uses%20its%20limited%20detention,public% 20safety%20or%20flight%20risk [https://perma.cc/QUE5-AACU] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026).
[30] Id.
[31] Hibah Ansari, Inside an ICE Detention Center: Detained People Describe Severe Medical Neglect, Harrowing Conditions, ACLU (Dec. 17, 2025), https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/inside-an-ice-detention-center-detained-people-describe-severe-medical-neglect-harrowing-conditions [https://perma.cc/7XM5-AZ8J].
[32] Diana Flores, How ICE’s detention system makes people untraceable, Am. Friends Serv. Comm. (Dec. 30, 2025), https://afsc.org/news/how-ices-detention-system-makes-people-untraceable [https://perma.cc/8VVW-4D93].
[33] Parole vs. Bond in the Asylum System, Hum. Rts. First (Sept. 5, 2018), https://humanrightsfirst.org/library/parole-vs-bond-in-the-asylum-system/ [https://perma.cc/NT8U-UB4E] [hereinafter Parole vs. Bond in the Asylum System].
[34] Id.
[35] Immigration Enforcement Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https://www.ice.gov/immigration-enforcement-frequently-asked-questions#:~:text=ICE%20officers%20and%20agents%20can%20also%20detain%20and%20search%20people,removed%20from%20the%20United%20States [https://perma.cc/5BTB-D3YY] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026) [hereinafter Immigration Enforcement].
[36] Id.
[37] Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, New Report Details ICE’s Expanding and Increasingly Unaccountable Detention System, Am. Immigr. Council (Jan. 23, 2026), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-expanding-detention-system/ [https://perma.cc/NPK8-6LXN].
[38] Meg Anderson, Private prisons and jails are ramping up as ICE detention exceeds capacity, NPR (Jun. 4, 2025), https://www.npr.org/2025/06/04/nx-s1-5417980/private-prisons-and-local-jails-are-ramping-up-as-ice-detention-exceeds-capacity [https://perma.cc/FEC8-KKJU].
[39] Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2198(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
[40] Id.
[41] Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980), https://archivesfoundation.org/documents/refugee-act-1980/ [https://perma.cc/4AXT-W2CA] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026).
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] U.S. Const. amend. V.
[45] Due Process Violations: Implications in Immigration & Beyond, Acacia Ctr. for Just., https://acaciajustice.org/due-process-violations/ [https://perma.cc/9F5S-GA28] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026).
[46] Id.
[47] INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2025) [hereinafter INA]; Ximena Bustillo & Anusha Mathur, The DOJ has been firing judges with immigrant defense backgrounds, NPR (Nov. 6, 2025), https://www.npr.org/2025/11/06/g-s1-96437/trump-immigration-judges-fired [https://perma.cc/PNJ9-Y7DA]; Ximena Bustillo & Scott Simon, The Trump administration fired nearly 100 immigration judges in 2025. What‘s next?, NPR (Jan. 10, 2026), https://www.npr.org/2026/01/10/nx-s1-5672386/the-trump-administration-fired-nearly-100-immigration-judges-in-2025-whats-next [https://perma.cc/2D4P-2PAP].
[48] Id.
[49] Bustillo & Simon, supra note 47.
[50] Id.
[51] Id.
[52] Gisela Salomon, Migrants face dire conditions and prolonged waits in U.S. detention centers, PBSNews (Feb. 9, 2026), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/migrants-face-dire-conditions-and-prolonged-waits-in-u-s-detention-centers [https://perma.cc/4LZV-RPZT]; Reichlin-Melnick, supra note 37.
[53] How are laws changing for asylum seekers?, ASAP (Feb. 2, 2026), https://asaptogether.org/en/law-changes-jan-2025/ [https://perma.cc/HGL4-DTPB].
[54] Roughly one-fifth of asylum-seekers are under 18 years old. Id.; Diana Roy, How the U.S. asylum process works, PBSNews (May 13, 2023), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/how-the-u-s-asylum-process-works#:~:text=Where%20do%20most%20asylum%20seekers,Salvador%2C%20Guatemala%2C%20and%20Honduras.&text=California%2C%20New%20York%2C%20Maryland%2C,under%20the%20age%20of%2018 [https://perma.cc/5WMY-DHXN].
[55] How are laws changing for asylum seekers?, supra note 53.
[56] Mike Catalini & Steve Karnowski, PBSNews (Jan. 27, 2026), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ice-chief-ordered-to-appear-in-court-to-explain-why-detainees-have-been-denied-due-process [https://perma.cc/CDW8-NUW4].
[57] Supreme Court Rules Immigrants Can Be Held Indefinitely Without Bond, Immigr. Legal Def. (Jun. 27, 2025), https://www.ild.org/immigrant-legal-defense-blog/supreme-court-rules-immigrants-can-be-held-indefinitely-without-bond [https://perma.cc/4EGJ-4V9A].
[58] Id.
[59] USCIS rejects certain application forms for incompleteness if any fields are left blank, Immigr. Pol’y Tracking Project (Jan. 23, 2020), https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/uscis-rejecting-certain-application-forms-for-incompleteness-if-any-fields-are-left-blank/ [https://perma.cc/U8SF-F2JD].
[60] Immigration Court Quick Fact, TRAC Immgr., https://tracreports.org/immigration/quickfacts/eoir.html [https://perma.cc/SK6V-6BQ9] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026); Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge [https://perma.cc/MZ9K-3JEB] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026).
[61] USCIS rejects certain application forms for incompleteness if any fields are left blank, supra note 59.
[62] See U.S. Const. amend V; INA, supra note 47.
[63] Adriel D. Orozco, DOJ Moves to End Administrative Immigration Appeals to Speed Up Mass Deportations, Am. Immigr. Council (Feb. 13, 2026), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/justice-departments-end-immigration-appeals-deportations/ [https://perma.cc/JZ4B-5VN5].
[64] Ben Penn, Celine Castronuovo, & Megan Crepeau, Migrant Detentions Spur Crushing Workload for Prosecutors (2), Bloomberg Law (Feb. 5, 2026), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/us-attorneys-decry-resource-strain-from-migrant-detention-cases [https://perma.cc/57B4-JE9A].
[65] Bustillo & Simon, supra note 47.
[66] INA, supra note 47.
[67] Castronuovo, supra note 22.
[68] Malcolm Gladwell, The Hand that Rocks the Gavel, This Am. Life (Sept. 19, 2025), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/868/the-hand-that-rocks-the-gavel [https://perma.cc/75DL-WMR6].
[69] Id.
[70] Id.; U.S. Const. amend. V; INA, supra note 47.
[71] Gladwell, supra note 68.
[72] Id.
[73] Id.
[74] Unlawful ICE Arrests, supra note 26.
[75] Salomon, supra note 52.
[76] Id.; U.S. Const. amend. V.
[77] Ansari, supra note 31.
[78] Castronuovo, supra note 22; Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 41.
[79] Bustillo & Simon, supra note 46.
[80] Id.
[81] Unlawful ICE Arrests, supra note 26.
[82] Immigration Enforcement, supra note 35.
[83] Id.
[84] USAFacts, supra note 9.
[85] U.S. Const. amend. V; INA, supra note 46; Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 41.
[86] Ansari, supra note 31; Flores, supra note 32; Parole vs. Bond in the Asylum System, supra note 33.
[87] Castronuovo, supra note 22
[88] U.S. Const. amend. V; INA, supra note 46; Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 41.
[89] Immigration Enforcement, supra note 35.
[90] Bustillo & Simon, supra note 47.
[91] UNHCR, supra note 5; OHCHR, supra note 39.
[92] Id.
[93] U.S. Const. amend. V.
[94] U.S. Const. amend. V; INA, supra note 46; Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 41.
[95] U.S. Const. amend. V; INA, supra note 46; Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 41.
[96] U.S. Const. amend. V; INA, supra note 46; Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 41.
[97] U.S. Const. amend. V; INA, supra note 46; Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 41.
[98] Immigration Detention is Bigger, supra note 10; Gregory H. Stanton, Mass Deportations are Crimes in US and International Law, Genocide Watch (Jun. 16, 2025), https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/mass-deportations-are-crimes-in-us-and-international-law [https://perma.cc/ST2Q-HJZA].
[99] Castronuovo, supra note 22.
