Cameron McDonald, Associate Member, Immigration and Human Rights Law Review
I. Introduction
War is often understood as a policy of violence the powerful use to impose their will.[1] War and other armed conflicts have long been among the largest drivers of forced mass migration.[2] War forces civilians to flee the instability and dangers wrought upon them.[3] The United States has played a central role in several modern conflicts that have caused mass displacement, including the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan.[4] In both cases, U.S. involvement contributed to large-scale displacement that reshaped U.S. and international refugee systems.[5]
Since the start of the Iran War on February 28th, 2026, the United States has once again set in motion destabilizing forces that have historically resulted in widespread displacement.[6] Unlike prior conflicts, however, current U.S. immigration policies sharply limit the ability of displaced individuals to seek refuge in the United States. This shift creates a clear disconnect between U.S. military actions abroad and U.S. domestic immigration framework.[7]
This blog examines that disconnect, focusing on how the Trump administration’s military engagement abroad contrasts with its increasingly restrictive immigration policies at home. Part II provides background on the 2026 U.S. War in Iran and offers a comparison of U.S. immigration policies under President Trump with those implemented during the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars. Part III discusses how the United States has systematically limited pathways to migration while directly contributing to global conditions that drive displacement, the consequences of this forced migration, and the United States’ broader hypocrisy as a result. Finally, Part IV concludes by addressing how the lack of alignment between domestic and international U.S. actions may affect the United States’ credibility on the global stage.
II. Background
The 2026 U.S. immigration system presents a structural contradiction to U.S. military action.[8] Examining the relationship between 2026 U.S. immigration policy and U.S. actions in Iran requires historical and legal comparisons. While the United States has historically adjusted its immigration policies in response to war-driven migration, recent shifts in U.S. immigration enforcement reflect a stark departure from this pattern.[9] This section outlines the 2026 U.S. War in Iran and the resulting migration patterns, then examines key changes in U.S. immigration policy, and finally situates both within the broader historical context of war-driven displacement and prior U.S. responses.
A. 2026 U.S. War in Iran
Officially, the United States has not declared war on Iran in 2026.[10] President Trump has not sought congressional authorization for these military actions, which the administration has framed as efforts to support the Iranian people by overthrowing the current Iranian regime.[11] Moreover, President Trump also claims that Iran’s alleged nuclear development and supposed threats to U.S. interests and allies led to the escalated tension.[12] However, under widely accepted international frameworks that define armed conflict by the use of military force between states rather than formal declarations, the current hostilities meet the definition of war.[13]
As of April 10, 2026, reports indicate that more than 3,600 people have been killed as a result of U.S.-led strikes in Iran, including at least 1,701 civilians and 254 children.[14] Despite the United States’ attempt to avoid formally labeling the conflict as a war, the scale and consequences of these military attacks align directly with traditional understandings of armed conflicts.[15]
Similar to previous U.S.-backed wars, the immediate result has been massive civilian displacement as individuals flee violence and instability.[16] Within two weeks of the initial strikes, U.S. actions displaced more than three million Iranians, with some estimates suggesting that the number could rise dramatically if the conflict continues.[17] Although the United States currently houses the largest Iranian migrant population in the world, no Iranian displaced from this U.S.-forced war will be able to seek refuge in the United States.[18]
B. U.S. Anti-Immigration Policies
U.S. immigration policy has shifted significantly toward restriction and deportation under the Trump administration.[19] Refugee admissions, especially for Iranian refugees, have been severely restricted pursuant to a narrowing of 8 U.S.C. §1157—the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) that governs the admission of refugees into the United States and allows the President to set numerical caps on admission.[20]
Between October 2025 and April 2026, the United States admitted 4,499 refugees, with all but three identified as white South Africans.[21] This figure reflects a dramatic reduction as compared to prior years. By contrast, the Biden administration resettled approximately 125,000 refugees from eighty-five countries in 2023 alone.[22]
In addition, the Trump administration suspended the United States Refugee Admissions Program (“USRAP”) thirty-two days before the strike on Iran, citing public safety and national security concerns.[23] These entrance limitations have been accompanied by increased domestic enforcement, including expanded activity by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and the use of aggressive and arguably inhumane detention and removal practices.[24] Moreover, nationality-based travel bans have further restricted entry for individuals from Iran and other regions targeted by U.S. military activity.[25]
Collectively, these policies do not merely regulate immigration; they systematically prevent people displaced by U.S. action from accessing protection within the United States.[26] This immigration strategy marks a turning point from prior U.S. policy, where large-scale displacement resulting from U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts was often met with expanded refugee protections rather than restriction.[27]
C. Historical Comparison: Wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan
Historically, when U.S. militarily intervention caused mass migration, the United States adjusted its refugee policies accordingly.[28] The Vietnam War and the war in Afghanistan each produced immense refugee populations, many of whom ultimately resettled in the United States through expanded humanitarian programs.[29]
The Vietnam War, which lasted from 1955 to 1975, generated more than two million refugees. In 1975 alone, approximately 125,000 Vietnamese refugees resettled in the United States, and following the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, more than 1.3 million Vietnamese immigrants entered the country by 2022.[30] Similarly, the War in Afghanistan, which spanned from 2001 to 2021, resulted in nearly six million refugees, with approximately 200,000 resettled in the United States while millions sought refuge in neighboring countries such as Iran.[31]
These responses reflect an acknowledgment that U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts directly contributed to the displacement of civilians and, in turn, created a responsibility to provide a place of refuge.[32] In contrast, the 2026 war in Iran is unfolding alongside a backdrop of unprecedented restriction on immigration and refugee admissions.[33] The United States has not implemented comparable policy adjustments to address the foreseeable migration consequences of its military actions, marking a departure from prior practice.[34]
III. Discussion
The 2026 U.S. immigration framework reflects a fundamental shift from accommodating to restrictive, especially in the context of war-driven migration.[35] In 2026, the United States restricted Iranian immigrants from entering the United States—the country which houses the most Iranian immigrants in the world—and then began a war in Iran that has already displaced millions.[36] While U.S. military actions abroad continue to generate conditions that force people to flee their homes, domestic immigration policies increasingly restrict access to asylum and other forms of legal protection.[37] This section argues that the United States is not merely restructuring the immigration system to protect U.S. citizens but is actively constructing a system designed to prevent refugees displaced by U.S. actions from seeking refuge in the United States.
A. Shifting Restrictions to Systemically Deter and Threaten Immigration
The Trump administration has justified recent immigration restrictions primarily on national security grounds.[38] As a result, access to asylum has been reduced to historically low levels, effectively removing all legal pathways for individuals fleeing violence.[39] However, empirical research consistently shows that immigrants are significantly less likely to commit crimes than native-born U.S. citizens, undermining the argument that refugees pose a heightened security threat.[40] Furthermore, Iranians are among the most highly educated immigrant populations in the United States, with around seventy-nine percent having attended college, compared to fifty-eight percent of U.S. adults overall.[41] Despite the Trump administration’s attempt to characterize refugees and immigrants as threats to public safety and national security, the available evidence suggests that these populations substantially and positively contribute to the economic, educational, and social fabric of the United States.[42]
In prior conflicts in which the United States played a central role, such as the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, large influxes of refugees were met with expanded legal mechanisms for entry and protection once inside the United States.[43] In 2026, however, asylum seekers can hardly present a claim for asylum due to narrowed eligibility standards and administrative constraints, such as the indefinite suspension of USRAP.[44] As a result, individuals displaced by the U.S. war in Iran face an immigration system that is structurally incapable of admitting the very people that migrate as a result of U.S. military action.[45] Although the Trump administration has framed its military actions as efforts to support and free the Iranian people, President Trump has not extended corresponding protections to displaced individuals seeking asylum in the United States.[46]
Moreover, even if refugees could still enter the United States successfully, ICE activity has expanded domestically in ways that threaten immigrants and U.S. citizens alike.[47] Improper training for ICE officers and the growth of unconstitutional detention facilities has created a dangerous environment that prioritizes surveillance, detention, and removal.[48] ICE’s anti-immigrant rhetoric transforms the United States from a safe haven for refugees into a place of continued instability, prolonged detention, and potential violence rather than protection.[49] The expansion of corrupt U.S. detention practices exacerbates the politicization and dehumanization of immigration in the United States.[50]
Furthermore, the nationality-based restrictions implemented in late January 2026 reinforce the concept that barriers to asylum target the populations most likely to be affected by U.S. military actions abroad.[51] Therefore, not only is it increasingly difficult for many individuals to seek refuge in the United States now, it is in some cases effectively impossible for refugees from at least nineteen countries, including Iran, to enter the United States, unless the individual is an ethnic or religious minority facing persecution in Iran.[52] This closes the door to all refugees fleeing Iran due to the violence and instability brought by U.S. action.[53] Again, the Trump administration’s rationale for this war was to protect the citizens of Iran, yet it has restricted and suspended Iranian citizens from seeking refuge.[54] The United States has already displaced more than three million Iranians, and more will be displaced if this war continues.[55]
B. The Predictable Consequences of War-Driven Displacement
Historically, the United States has acknowledged that its military actions contribute to large-scale displacement and thus has responded by expanding pathways for refugee resettlement.[56] During the Vietnam War, which produced more than two million refugees, over 1.3 million individuals eventually resettled in the United States through mechanisms like the Refugee Act of 1980.[57] Similarly, the war in Afghanistan led to roughly 200,000 refugees resettling in the United States.[58]
These historical responses to U.S. refugee policies reflect a clear understanding that civilians displaced by war are not the intended targets of military action.[59] Therefore, civilians who are forced to migrate due to war should not be vilified and ostracized by the United States, especially when the United States has directly contributed to the conditions forcing their displacement. Rather, the United States should continue their practice of providing a safe haven for civilians whose lives are uprooted by an American-led war.
The 2026 war in Iran, however, establishes a complete departure from precedent.[60] U.S.-led attacks immediately displaced millions of Iranians, with experts warning that as many as fifty-six million people could be forced to migrate, as well as over three million Afghan refugees who sought asylum in Iran after the U.S. war in Afghanistan.[61] This scale of displacement is significant in the context of recent global migration trends, particularly as countries such as the United States and several European states continue to restrict refugee admissions.[62] If the conflict continues to escalate, the number of displaced individuals could increase dramatically, raising the risk of a major humanitarian crisis.[63]
The United States has not revised its immigration policies in response to the millions of already displaced Iranians, nor is it likely to do so while the Trump administration retains power.[64] This legal disconnect represents a striking shift from past U.S. practice and reflects a staggering shift toward more restrictive immigration policies.[65] While the United States is home to one of the largest Iranian immigrant populations in the world, the Trump administration has not only suspended the possibility for displaced Iranians to seek asylum but has contributed to conditions that may increase displacement through its internationally condemned war in Iran.[66]
C. The US Hypocrisy: Creating Refugees While Denying Refugees Protection
The 2026 U.S. war in Iran is an international showcase of U.S. contradictions in both policy and structure because the United States is directly creating the very mass migrations it claims to oppose.[67] While the original goal of the U.S.-led strikes was to free the Iranian people from an oppressive regime, this war has already resulted in the deaths of at least 1,701 civilians and the displacement of over three million people.[68] This unprecedented and growing migration crisis is a foreseeable consequence of waging a militarized war, yet the U.S. government intentionally dismantled any legal pathway for these victims of U.S. aggression to seek refuge in the United States.[69] By suspending USRAP one month and one day before the first strikes on Iran, the Trump administration ensured that the millions of individuals whose lives have changed forever would be systematically restricted from seeking asylum in the United States.[70]
The policy of producing refugees while denying them protection harshly opposes international refugee norms and dismantles any U.S. credibility as an advocate for human rights.[71] By prioritizing anti-immigration sentiment over any semblance of humanitarian responsibilities, the United States is creating a global crisis that destroys foreign livelihoods while constructing a domestic system that ensures the survivors of its war have no legal recourse in the United States to protect themselves.[72]
IV. Conclusion
The dangerous combination of the United States’ anti-immigrant sentiment with its military actions will inevitably lead to more mass migrations abroad.[73] As history demonstrates, war remains a primary driver of forced migrations, and U.S. involvement in such conflicts contributes to that dynamic.[74]
At the same time, policies such as the suspension of USRAP and the implementation of nationality-based bans have significantly limited access to protection for displaced individuals.[75] As a result, those affected by conflict face increasingly constrained pathways to refuge, both within the United States and globally. This divergence between military engagement and immigration policy raises broader questions about the United States’ role in responding to the humanitarian consequences of its actions. By contributing to displacement while limiting access to asylum, the United States departs from patterns established in prior conflicts and risks undermining its credibility as a consistent advocate for refugee protection.
Ultimately, this policy disconnect transforms the United States into an irrational actor on the global stage, undermining its own credibility in its long-term interests for human rights. By destabilizing entire regions with its warmongering and then refusing to address the resulting fallout, U.S. actions erode the international system of protection for asylum seekers. By refusing to coherently align its military actions and immigration policies, the United States lives in its own deluded hypocrisy and the world suffers as a result.
[1] Nick Bosio, What is War? Defining War, Conflict and Competition, Australian Army Rsch. Ctr. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/what-war-defining-war-conflict-and-competition [https://perma.cc/743V-WCLD].
[2] Id.
[3] Id.; Mark Montgomery, Weaponized Mass Migration: A Security Risk to Europe and the United States, Found. for Def. of Democracies (Feb. 10, 2026), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/02/10/weaponized-mass-migration/ [https://perma.cc/W7H6-JHP5].
[4] Kathleen Newland, Resources on the 40th Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon, Migration Pol’y Inst., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/international-program-us-immigration-policy-program/resources-40th-anniversary-fall-saigon#:~:text=From%20Humanitarian%20to%20Economic:%20The,changing%20nature%20of%20Vietnamese%20migration [https://perma.cc/6XVZ-7ZTX] (last visited Apr. 21, 2026); Matthew Willner-Reid, Afghanistan: Displacement Challenges in a Country on the Move, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/afghanistan-displacement-challenges-country-move [https://perma.cc/R299-BV8W].
[5] Newland, supra note 4; Willner-Reid, supra note 4.
[6] Fredrik Logevall, Are we officially at war with Iran?, Harv. Kennedy Sch. (Apr. 7, 2026), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/international-relations-security/are-we-officially-war-iran [https://perma.cc/J57R-7TBR]; Suzanne Maloney, et al., After the strike: The danger of war in Iran, Brookings (Mar. 3, 2026), http://brookings.edu/articles/after-the-strike-the-danger-of-war-in-iran/#:~:text=On%20February%2028%2C%202026%2C%20the%20United%20States,and%20what’s%20at%20stake%20internationally%20and%20domestically [https://perma.cc/HM5L-ARTV].
[7] Trump Administration Ends Refugee Pathway for Persecuted Iranian Religious Minorities, HIAS (Feb. 3, 2026), https://hias.org/statements/trump-administration-ends-refugee-pathway-persecuted-iranian-religious-minorities/#:~:text=Trump%20Administration%20Ends%20Refugee%20Pathway,religious%20minorities%20in%20grave%20danger [https://perma.cc/W76M-39NQ] [hereinafter HIAS].
[8] Id.; Newland, supra note 4; Willner-Reid, supra note 4; Logevall, supra note 6.
[9] HIAS, supra note 7; Newland, supra note 4; Willner-Reid, supra note 4; Logevall, supra note 6.
[10] U.S. Senate, About Declarations of War by Congress, https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/declarations-of-war.htm#:~:text=Congress%20approved%20its%20last%20formal%20declaration%20of,U.S.%20military%20policy%20through%20appropriations%20and%20oversight [https://perma.cc/P54B-CBHH] (last visited Apr. 21, 2026).
[11] Logevall, supra note 6; Natasha Hausdorff & Hillel Neuer, Is the War with Iran Legal? A Top International Lawyer Explains, UN Watch (Mar. 6, 2026), https://unwatch.org/is-the-war-with-iran-legal-a-top-international-lawyer-explains/#:~:text=Natasha%20Hausdorff:%20As%20the%20United,U.S.%20forces%20in%20a%20mistake [https://perma.cc/YV8W-C5TF]; Louis Jacobson & Amy Sherman, Fact-checking Trump and Hegseth’s claims of U.S. ‘victory’ in the Iran war, PBS News (Apr. 9, 2026), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/fact-checking-trump-and-hegseths-claims-of-u-s-victory-in-the-iran-war#:~:text=The%20killings%20of%20Iranian%20leaders,export%20and%20source%20of%20income [https://perma.cc/MM6Q-U5AB].
[12] Logevall, supra note 6; Hausdorff & Neuer, supra note 11; Jacobson & Sherman, supra note 11.
[13] United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), & International Science Council (ISC), UNDRR–ISC Hazard Information Profiles – 2025 Update: IAC International Armed Conflict, https://www.undrr.org/terms/hips/SO0101 [https://perma.cc/5ZQZ-6JMZ].
[15] Id.
[16] Ayaki Ito, UNHCR: Up to 3.2 million Iranians temporarily displaced in Iran as conflict intensifies, USA for UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency (Mar. 12, 2026), https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/press-releases/unhcr-3-2-million-iranians-temporarily-displaced-iran-conflict-intensifies [https://perma.cc/K2QH-8T3G].
[17] Id.; Abid Hussain, Iran’s neighbors brace for fallout as war threatens new refugee crisis, AlJazeera (Mar. 17, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/17/irans-neighbours-prepare-for-fallout-as-war-threatens-new-refugee-crisis#:~:text=Crisis%20on%20an%20unprecedented%20scale,absorb%20them%2C%E2%80%9D%20he%20said [https://perma.cc/9SEJ-4UUZ].
[18] Tianjian Lai & Jeanne Batalova, Immigrants from Iran in the United States, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Jul. 15. 2026), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/iranian-immigrants-united-states [https://perma.cc/L5X7-5AEL].
[19] Idean Salehyan, In light of harsh representations in Iran, the US should grant Temporary Protected Status to Iranians already here, Niskanen Ctr. (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.niskanencenter.org/in-light-of-harsh-repression-in-iran-the-us-should-grant-temporary-protected-status-to-iranians-already-here/#:~:text=The%20gap%20between%20rhetoric%20and%20policy,-The%20Trump%20administration&text=However%2C%20domestic%20immigration%20policy%20tells,of%20Iranian%20nationals%20last%20year [https://perma.cc/KT6B-XYDV]; Muzaffar Chishti, Kathleen Bush-Joseph & Colleen Putzel-Kavanaugh, Unleashing Power in New Ways: Immigration in the First Year of Trump 2.0, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Jan. 13, 2026), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trump-2-immigration-1st-year#:~:text=In%20some%20cases%2C%20the%20administration,ballooned%20under%20the%20Biden%20administration [https://perma.cc/8SWS-UQ26].
[20] Chris Plummer, Refugees Challenge Discriminatory use of Admissions Program, CWS Global (Apr. 8, 2026), https://cwsglobal.org/press-releases/refugees-challenge-discriminatory-use-of-admissions-program/ [https://perma.cc/VUJ6-P5TX].
[21] Donald J. Trump, Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2026, The Am. Presidency Project (Sept. 30, 2025), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-determination-refugee-admissions-for-fiscal-year-2026 [https://perma.cc/EWT8-SH73]; Mayeni Jones, US has let in 4,499 refugees since October – all but three were South African, BBC (Apr. 10, 2026), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g89kkvenqo [https://perma.cc/D46C-WSHW]. This article explains how white South Africans are considered refugees as part of the Trump administration’s claim that there is a “white genocide” happening in South Africa.
[22] Trump, supra note 21; Jones, supra note 21.
[23] Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States, U.S. Dept. of State (Feb. 2, 2026), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/visas-news/suspension-of-visa-issuance-to-foreign-nationals-to-protect-the-security-of-the-united-states.html#:~:text=Presidential%20Proclamation%2010949%20remained%20in,Lawful%20Permanent%20Residents%20(LPRs) [https://perma.cc/G44X-JGC8] [hereinafter Suspension of Visa Issuance]; Pegah Karimbakhsh Asli, Iran Travel Ban 2026: Which Visas Are Still Available for Iranian Nationals, alma (Mar. 28, 2026), https://www.tryalma.com/learn/iran-travel-ban-visas-iranian-nationals [https://perma.cc/KT6B-XYDV]; Salehyan, supra note 16; Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/realigning-the-united-states-refugee-admissions-program/#:~:text=(b)%20The%20Secretary%20of%20Homeland,consultation%20requirements%20in%208%20U.S.C. [https://perma.cc/BG7J-UWVM].
[24] Policy Brief | Snapshot of ICE Detention: Inhumane Conditions and Alarming Expansion, Nat’l Immigr. Just. Ctr. (Sept. 20, 2024), https://immigrantjustice.org/research/policy-brief-snapshot-of-ice-detention-inhumane-conditions-and-alarming-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/YSR8-JC6N] [hereinafter Policy Brief]; Paul Ong, Jonathon Ong, & Sonja Diaz, Latino Ice Detentions Dramatically Reshaped Under Trump, UCLA Ctr. for Neighborhood Knowledge 1, 2 (2026), https://knowledge.luskin.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/UCLA_CNK_Unseen_Latino_ICE_Detentions_Dramatically_Reshaped_Under_Trump_Jan2026.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9V9-63RR]; Doug Most, Are ICE Detention Centers Concentration Camps?, BU Today (June 27, 2019), https://www.bu.edu/articles/2019/are-ice-detention-centers-concentration-camps/ [https://perma.cc/S3NE-9UUH].
[25] Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23.
[26] Id.
[27] Grace Bui, The Resettlement of Vietnamese and Montagnard Refugees Residing in Thailand, Nat’l Bureau of Asian Rsch. (Sept. 10, 2022), https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-resettlement-of-vietnamese-and-montagnard-refugees-residing-in-thailand/ [https://perma.cc/B52W-P6A3]; Jeanne Batalova, Vietnamese Immigrants in the United States, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Oct. 11, 2023), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/vietnamese-immigrants-united-states#:~:text=The%20end%20of%20the%20Vietnam,in%202022%20were%20from%20Vietnam [https://perma.cc/LT4S-R3UH]; Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained, USA for UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency (Sept. 10, 2022), https://www.unrefugees.org/news/afghanistan-refugee-crisis-explained/#:~:text=After%20more%20than%20four%20decades,refugee%20situations%20in%20the%20world. [https://perma.cc/3VN8-JLUL].
[28] Bui, supra note 27; Batalova, supra note 27; Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained, supra note 27.
[29] Bui, supra note 27; Batalova, supra note 27; Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained, supra note 27.
[30] The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the Immigration and Nationality Act by aligning U.S. legal framework for refugee resettlement and asylum with UN standards, nearly tripled the annual admission ceiling, and established the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) [hereinafter Refugee Act of 1980]; Bui, supra note 27; Batalova, supra note 27.
[31] Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained, supra note 27.
[32] Bui, supra note 27; Batalova, supra note 27; Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained, supra note 27.
[33] Trump, supra note 21; Jones, supra note 21; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23.
[34] Trump, supra note 21; Jones, supra note 21; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23; Hussain, supra note 17.
[35] Trump, supra note 21; Jones, supra note 21; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23; Hussain, supra note 17.
[36] Trump, supra note 21; Jones, supra note 21; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23; Hussain, supra note 17.
[37] Trump, supra note 21; Jones, supra note 21; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23; Hussain, supra note 17.
[38] Jones, supra note 21; Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 23.
[39] Jones, supra note 21.
[40] Undocumented Immigrant Offending Rate Lower than U.S.-Born Citizen Rate, Nat’l Inst. of Just. (Sept. 12, 2024), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU01/20250122/117827/HHRG-119-JU01-20250122-SD004.pdf [https://perma.cc/GVH7-R8CW]; Stephanie Kulke, Immigrants are significantly less likely to commit crimes than the U.S.-born, Northwestern Now (Mar. 12, 2024), https://www.congress.gov/119/meeting/house/117980/documents/HHRG-119-GO00-20250305-SD029.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK76-NKQK] [hereinafter Undocumented Immigrant Offending Rate Lower]; Debunking the Myth of Immigrants and Crime, Am. Immigr. Council (Oct. 17, 2024), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/debunking-myth-immigrants-and-crime/ [https://perma.cc/5FSH-DNRG].
[41] Dalia Fahmy & Jeffrey S. Passel, 7 facts about Iranians in the U.S., Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Mar. 5, 2026), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/03/05/7-facts-about-iranian-americans/ [https://perma.cc/42L2-W9WB].
[42] Id.; The Marshall Project, Fact-checking Over 12,000 of Donald Trump’s Quotes About Immigrants, The Marshall Project (Oct. 21, 2024), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2024/10/21/fact-check-12000-trump-statements-immigrants [https://perma.cc/Z2M5-F2JC]; Undocumented Immigrant Offending Rate Lower, supra note 40; Debunking the Myth of Immigrants and Crime, supra note 40.
[43] Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained, supra note 27; Research Act of 1980, supra note 30.
[44] Jones, supra note 21; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23; Asli, supra note 23; Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 23.
[45] Jones, supra note 21; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23; Asli, supra note 23; Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 23.
[46] Jones, supra note 21; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23; Asli, supra note 23; Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 23; Fahmy & Passel, supra note 41.
[47] Policy Brief, supra note 24; Ong, Ong, & Diaz, supra note 24; Most, supra note 24.
[48] Policy Brief, supra note 24; Ong, Ong, & Diaz, supra note 24; Most, supra note 24.
[49] Policy Brief, supra note 24; Ong, Ong, & Diaz, supra note 24; Most, supra note 24.
[50] Policy Brief, supra note 24; Ong, Ong, & Diaz, supra note 24; Most, supra note 24.
[51] Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23.
[52] Id.
[53] Id.
[54] Id.
[55] Ito, supra note 16.
[56] Bui, supra note 27; Batalova, supra note 27; Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained, supra note 27.
[57] Bui, supra note 27; Batalova, supra note 27; Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 30.
[58] Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained, supra note 27.
[59] Id.
[60] Logevall, supra note 6; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23; Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained, supra note 27; Bui, supra note 27; Batalova, supra note 27; Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 30.
[61] Ito, supra note 16; Hussain, supra note 17.
[62] Rut Bermejo Casado, The trail of Trump’s (anti-)immigration policies in Europe, Real instituto elcano (Mar. 13, 2025), https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/the-trail-of-trumps-anti-immigration-policies-in-europe/ [https://perma.cc/J63S-QH63].
[63] Hussain, supra note 17.
[64] Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 23.
[65] Id.; Casado, supra note 61; Extremism Fact Sheet | Xenophobia & Anti-Immigrant Extremism: From Fringe to Mainstream, Hum. Rts. First (Mar. 30, 2023), https://humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/FINAL-Xenophobia-2023.pdf [https://perma.cc/365Y-ZRN7].
[66] Fahmy & Passel, supra note 41; Logevall, supra note 6; Maloney, supra note 6.
[67] Fahmy & Passel, supra note 41; Logevall, supra note 6; Maloney, supra note 6.
[68] Fahmy & Passel, supra note 41; Logevall, supra note 6; Maloney, supra note 6; Abdallah & Alaaeldin, supra note 14.
[69] Fahmy & Passel, supra note 41; Logevall, supra note 6; Maloney, supra note 6; Abdallah & Alaaeldin, supra note 14.
[70] Fahmy & Passel, supra note 41; Logevall, supra note 6; Maloney, supra note 6; Abdallah & Alaaeldin, supra note 14; Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 23.
[71] Fahmy & Passel, supra note 41; Logevall, supra note 6; Maloney, supra note 6; Abdallah & Alaaeldin, supra note 14; Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 23; Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 30.
[72] Ito, supra note 16; Hussain, supra note 17; Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 23; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23.
[73] Ito, supra note 16; Hussain, supra note 17; Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 23; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23.
[74] Ito, supra note 16; Hussain, supra note 17; Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 23; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23.
[75] Ito, supra note 16; Hussain, supra note 17; Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 23; Suspension of Visa Issuance, supra note 23.
